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THE RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING IN
JAPANESE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Nathaniel L. Nathanson*
Yasuhiro Fujita**
The right to fair hearing in contemporary Japanese administrative
law is a tender plant, lacking deep roots in historical tradition, and struggling for survival in a relatively hostile environment, Fair hearing
was a concept practically unknown to the administrative law of pre-war
Japan, which, taking its cue from German and French law, relied principally, not on the procedural rights of the individual, but rather upon
the skill and dedication of administrators for the achievement of efficiency and justice, with only occasional judicial review by the Administrative Court.1 The Anglo-American maxim that "he who decides
must hear" was indeed foreign to most Japanese administrators. After
the war, however, Japanese constitutional revision emphasized individual rights and duties, and prescribed many procedural guarantees for
the judicial process;' at the same time, various regulatory and
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1. Compare Ogawa, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions in Japan, 43 WASHr.
L. REv. 1075 (1968); Hashimoto, The Rule of Law: Some Aspects of Judicial Review of
Administrative Action, in LAw n¢ JAPAN, 239-240 (A. von~lehren ed. 1963); Bachof,
German Administrative Law with Special Reference to the Latest Developments in the
System of Legal Protection, 2 INT'L A
Comx. L.Q. 368 (4th Ser. 1953); C. HAmsoN,
ExEcUTnva DIsCRnno AND JUDICIAL CONTROL: AN AsPECT oP THE FaaNcH CONSEm
D'ETAT (1954); B. ScawraTz, FRENcH ADimarSTRATIVn LAW AND TE COmmON LAW

WoRLD (1954). As to the Administrative Court, see note 71 infra.
2. For example, Article 37 of the Constitution provides that in all criminal cases the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal; that
he shall have full opportunity to examine all witnesses as well as the tight of compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses on his behalf, at public expense, and that he shall have
the assistance of competent counsel, who shall, if necessary, be assigned to his use by
the state. Article 38 provides that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself; that confessions made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged
arrest or detention shall not be admitted into evidence, and that no person shall be
convicted or punished in cases where the only proof against him is his own confession.
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welfare statutes introduced the Anglo-American concepts of "notice
and hearing," or audi alteram partem, into the Japanese administrative
process.
To date this experiment in legal transplantation has not been entirely successful. A recent official survey showed that, despite the
statutory provisions, hearings are rarely held, parties who are entitled
to an administrative hearing are generally reluctant to request one or
to seek judicial review when a hearing is denied, and administrative
agencies using the hearing procedure are inclined to regard it as only a
device designed to facilitate preliminary administrative investigation,
rather than as a procedure necessary to the protection of individual
rights.3 Nevertheless, there are hints of change in the wind. These are
especially apparent in two cases now pending before the Supreme
Court of Japan, in which the right to a fair hearing is the principal
issue. In one of these, Kawakami v. Tokyo Land Transportation
Bureau [hereafter referred to as the Taxi-Cab case] 4 the government
is appealing a decision of the Tokyo High Court which invalidated a
denial of a taxi-cab license on the ground that the applicant did not
receive a fair hearing. In the other case, Gumma Central Bus K.K. v.
Minister of Transportation,' the Bus Company is appealing a decision
of the Tokyo High Court which rejected the company's claim that it
was denied a fair hearing on its application for a certificate to operate
a new bus line. Before discussing these pending cases in detail, we
must outline the framework of Japanese constitutional law which
surrounds them.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR A RIGHT TO
FAIR HEARING
Although the present Japanese constitution reflects the influence of
American constitutionalism in many ways, particularly in its provision
3.

Rmnji GYOSEi CHSSAKAI, GY6SEI TETSuZUKI Ni KANSuRu HSyoKu

(Report on

administrative procedure by the Special Commission for Investigating [the Present Condition and Future Reform of] Administration) (1964) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. This
Report is discussed in greater detail later.
4.

16 Gy~sei jiken saiban reishii [hereinafter cited as Gy6sei reishfi]

1585 (Tokyo

High Ct., Sept. 16, 1965), affirming 14 Gy6sei reishdi 1666 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Sept. 18,
1963).

5. 1S Gy~sei reishfi 1014 (Tokyo High Ct., July 25, 1967), reversing 14 Gy~sei reishil
2255 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Dec. 25, 1963).
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for constitutional review of legislation by the judiciary 6 and in its guarantees of individual rights,7 yet one of its most notable omissions is the
absence of an explicit "due process clause" like those of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the American Constitution. The closest
analogous provision in the Japanese Constitution is in Article 31, which
provides:
No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other
criminal penality be imposed, except according to procedure established by law.
Even apart from the deletion of the word "property," and the phrase
"except according to procedure established by law" for the phrase "without due process of law," comparative interpretation of Article 31 and
the American due process clauses is further complicated by the interpolated clause "nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed."
There has been a wealth of Japanese academic analysis and considerable judicial exploration of the question whether Article 31 is equivalent in meaning to our due process clauses. There is, however, no
decision of the Japanese Supreme Court which explicitly holds that
Article 31 (or any other provision of the Japanese Constitution) protects
the private individual against administrative imposition of burdens, or
denial of benefits, without a fair hearing." Thus, the question whether
there is indeed a constitutional right to fair hearing under Japanese
administrative law remains open.
The strongest authority for expansive interpretation of Article 31,
treating the phrase "procedure established by law" as substantially
equivalent to "due process of law," is the Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Japan v. Nakamura.9 This case involved a forfeiture decree

6. JAPAIMSa CONST. art. 81 provides: "The Supreme Court is the court of last resort
with' power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official
act. The same power is also deemed, by implication, to reside in the inferior courts.
See Nathanson, ConstitutionalAdjudication in Japan, 7 Aix. J. or Coln,. L. 195 (1960).
7. These guarantees include, for example, freedom of thought and conscience (Arfide 19); freedom of religion (Article 20); "freedom of assembly and association, as
well as speech, press and all other forms of expression" (Article 21); freedom of occupation (Article 22) ; academic freedom (Article 23) ; and the right to own and hold property, which may be taken for public use only with just compensation (Article 29).
8. See, e.g., Ukai and Nathanson, Protection of Property Rights in the Japanese Constitution, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 1129 (1968), reprinted in TnE CoNsrrruioN op JAPAN,
ITs FmsT TwENn? Y-s, 1946-1967 239 (D. Henderson ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
HENDERSON and authorities there cited].
9. 16 Saik6 saibansho keiji hanreishil 1593 [hereinafter cited as Keishti]. (Sup. Ct.,
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entered against a vessel which had been used for illegal smuggling
purposes by defendants other than the owner of the vessel. The forfeiture was decreed incident to the criminal trial and conviction of the
smugglers, even though the owner of the vessel was neither formally
named as a defendant nor given an opportunity to contest the forfeiture.
A majority of the Grand Bench held that the decree of forfeiture of the
vessel, under these circumstances violated Article 29, paragraph 1, and
and Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution. In explanation of their
decision the majority said:10

However, in our opinion, depriving a person who is not a defendant of the ownership of a vessel or goods is extremely unreasonable and is not permissible under the Constitution, if done
without giving him notice and the opportunity to excuse or defend
himself. Article 29, paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides that
the right to own or to hold property is inviolable, and Article 31
of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life
or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except
according to procedure established by law. So if the ownership
of a vessel or cargo of a nondefendant will, as mentioned above,
be affected by a supplementary penal judgment of forfeiture
against the defendant, it is recessary to give the nondefendant
notice and the opportunity to excuse or defend himself. Without
this, depriving him of ownership amounts to the imposition of a
Grand Bench, Nov. 28, 1962). This is sometimes known as the Second Customs Law case,
as distinguished from the First Customs Law case, Japan v. Omachi 14 Keishfi 1574
(Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, Oct. 19, 1960), presenting substantially the same facts, and
explicitly overruled in Nakamura. In the Omachi case the Supreme Court, by a vote of
8 to 7, upheld the lower court's order of confiscation on the procedural ground that the
defendant Omachi could not take advantage of a third-party shipowner's constitutional
right. Apart from this threshold question, however, the concurring Justices Tarumi and
Takagi agreed with the 7 dissenting Justices, led by Justice Irie, that Article 31 of the
Constitution requires that an opportunity for hearing and defense must be afforded
whenever the State imposes a quasi-criminal penalty, or makes some other disposition
which may encroach upon the people's rights. In still a third Customs Law case, Japan v.
Mihara, 16 KeishOi 1672 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, Dec. 12, 1962), the Court again
applied the rule of Nakamura. For more detailed analysis of these cases, see Henderson,
Japanese Judicial Review of Legislation: The First Twenty Years, 43 WAsH L. REv.
1005, 1023-27 (1968), reprinted in Henderson, supra note 8, at 115, 133-38.
10. This translation is taken from JUDGMENT UPON CASE OF VIOLATION OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW-SERIES OF PROMINENT JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPR-,E
COURT UPON QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY, -N,\o. 7 (General Secretariat, Supreme

Court of Japan 1964).
The whole of JAPANESE CONST. art. 29 reads as follows:
Article 29. The right to own or hold property is inviolable. Property rights shall
be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare.
Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation.
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penalty impairing the right to own and to hold property without
due process of law, Whatever kind of post-forfeiture remedy may
be available, it makes no difference here. Article 118, paragraph 1
of the Customs Law provides that vessels and goods relating to
the offenses described in that article, shall be forfeited even where
owned by a nondefendant; and there is no provision in the Customs Law or the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law,
providing for notice and the opportunity to excuse or defend.
Therefore, the forfeiture of property of a nondefendant under
article 118, paragraph 1 of the Customs Law, must be adjudged to
violate Articles 29 and 31 of the Constitution.
Although five of the fourteen justices who participated in the Nakamura case dissented from the judgment, none of these dissenters expressed disagreement with the majority holding that Articles 29 and
31 provide constitutional protection against deprivations of property
without "due process of law," generally, and more specifically notice
and opportunity to be heard. Rather, the principal basis of dissent was
that the defendants in the case, who did not own the vessel, lacked
standing to assert the constitutional rights of the owner."1 An additional ground for dissent was that, as a matter of general law and without recourse to constitutional theory, the forfeiture decree could not be
effective against an owner who was not party to the proceedings.' 2
Obviously, neither of these grounds detracts from the force of the
majority holding, except in so far as they may suggest the dissenters'
hesitancy to adopt the majority's constitutional theory.
The supplemental opinions of the three concurring justices serve
even less to undercut the basic thrust of the majority opinion. All of
these opinions expressly state the view that forfeiture of the owner's
property without notice and hearing is unconstitutional, even if it is
authorized by a statute. Indeed, one of the concurring opinions, that
of Justice Irie, adopts an interpretation of Article 31 which far surpasses that of the majority. Irie makes this statement:'"
First, (1) the guarantee of due process of Article 31 of the
Constitution is not satisfied merely by adhering to legal proce11,
izaka,
which
12.
13.

This was the position taken in the dissenting opinions of Justices Fujita, Shimoiand Ishizaka. Justice Tarumi referred to his concurring opinion in the Omachi case,
was to the same effect, Id, at 12, 15, 18 and 19.
This was the position taken in the dissenting opinion of Justice Yamada. Id. at 20.
Id. at 4-5.
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dutes. Even if legal procedures are adhered to, the guarantee is
violated if the substance of a law contravenes the basic constitutional principles existing in modern democratic countries. I understand that the guarantee of Article 31 applies not only to procedural provisions, but also to substantive laws governing rights
themselves. In addition, I understand that Article 31 applies not
only to the imposition of criminal penalties, but that, in addition
thereto, infringements on the rights or privileges of a person are
included in "deprivation of liberty." (The fact that Article 31
embodies the content of Article 23 of the Meiji Constitution, and
that Article 23 of the Meiji Constitution was generally understood
to apply to arrest, detention, hearing and punishment not only in
criminal proceedings but also in administrative proceedings should
be remembered.) However, (2) I do not think that Article 31
requires that notice and the opportunity to explain or defend always be given to a person whose rights or privileges are violated
by the state. Of course, by reading other provisions of the Constitution, e.g., Articles 32, 37 and 82, in conjunction with Article 31,
this clearly is required in criminal cases. But in cases other than
those involving criminal penalties, the necessity of giving notice
and the opportunity to explain or defend depends on the circumstances of the case; and to the extent not indispensable in order
to protect the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Constitution as a whole, failure to give notice and the opportunity to
explain or defend does not violate Article 31, putting aside the
question whether or not notice and the opportunity to explain or
defend may be desirable as a matter of legislative policy. (3) Since
a declaration of forfeiture of property belonging to a nondefendant
is inseparable from the main penalty imposed on the defendant,
the nondefendant must be made a party to the criminal proceeding, and he must be given a notice and an opportunity to explain
or defend himself; this is required by Article 31 of the Constitution.
This approach would provide both substantive and procedural constitutional protections from any type of detrimental governmental action
(whether legislative, judicial or administrative), although the degree of
protection would depend upon the seriousness of the invasion of individual rights.
Justice Irie's opinion also serves to highlight one aspect of the majority opinion which might be relied upon to distinguish the case from
ordinary administrative proceedings, and to limit its application to
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criminal cases and penalties. Nakamurawas, of course, a criminal case,
and the principal penalty inflicted upon the immediate defendants was
a criminal penalty-clearly within the scope of Article 31. The majority
opinion is susceptible to the interpretation that the decree of forfeiture
of the vessel was regarded as a "criminal penalty" within the meaning
of Article 31. Such an interpretation of Nakamura would clearly make
it inapplicable to most types of administrative proceedings, including,
for example, the granting and revocation of licenses. The general theory
of Justice Irie's opinion, on the other hand, would be equally applicable
to licensing proceedings; but he carefully refrained from committing
himself as to the ultimate extent to which notice and hearing are
constitutionally required in that type of administrative proceeding. 14
Thus, we must look elsewhere for support for the application of
Article 31 (with or without the aid of other constitutional provisions)
to administrative proceedings.
A case which is somewhat similar to Nakamura, in so far as it involves prejudice of third parties without notice, but in an administrative proceeding, is Hayashi Ken Zosen K. K. v. Koto Kainan Shimpanch'okan (Hayashi-Ken Shipbuilding K. K. v. The High Marine
Disasters Inquiry Board), decided by the Grand Bench of the Supreme
Court in 1961.1' This case involved a formal inquiry, conducted by the
defendant Board, as to the causes of a ship collision. After interrogating the masters and the owners of the colliding ships, the Board concluded that there was no negligence attributable to either of the
principals involved in the collision, but that, instead, the collision had
been caused by defects in a rudder installed by the plaintiff shipbuilder. The plaintiff, however, was not a party in any way to the
inquiry proceedings, and was given no opportunity to plead, present
evidence, or otherwise defend itself. Nevertheless, the Board declared
14. Japanese scholarly opinion is divided as to the extent to which the Customs Law
cases may be regarded as establishing a due process principle applicable to administrative

proceedings. See Takagi, Gyoseishobunzen no chomon (Hearing prior to administrative
disposition), in 2 SEIrrSsH:fJo S6aRnsU JOrGo-sHuON-xnmN RormU-snrO 1, 3-4, 24
(The Legal Training and Research Institute's 15th Anniversary Essays, 1963) ; Takayanagi,
Gydseitetsuzuki to jinken-hosl (Administrative procedure and human rights guarantee) 2
Kemp5 K6za 260, 277-79 (Constitutional Lecture Series, 1964).
15. 15 Saik6 saibansho minji hanreishil [hereinafter cited as MinshfiJ 467 (Sup. Ct.,
Grand Bench, March 15, 1961).
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in the "Dispositif," or judgment, part of its decision (shubun) that
the ship collision was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff company.
The shipbuilding company sued in the Tokyo High Court" to set
aside the Board's ruling on the ground that it violated the principle
of "no action, no decision" (fukoku furi no gensoku) insofar as it
implicated the plaintiff.' 7 In defense of its judgment, the Board argued
that the plaintiff had no standing to attack the ruling, since it did not
directly affect any right or interest of the plaintiff. The High Court
sustained the complaint, suggesting that the Board could have simply
decreed in the "Dispositif" that the parties before it were not subject to
any disciplinary measures, and stated in the "Reasons" that neither
party was guilty of negligence, but that the collision was caused by a
defect in a rudder installed by a third party. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the High Court's decision and dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the plaintiff had no standing to use. The Court held
that the Board's ruling did not impose any duty or disadvantage on
the plaintiff, and that its findings of fact would have no binding effect
in a criminal or civil suit against the plaintiff. Thus, there was no
"decision" against the plaintiff at all, and the principle of "no action,
no decision" was irrelevant. The court did, however, concede by way of
dictum that it was "inappropriate for the Board to find and declare in
its 'Dispositif' negligence on the part of the plaintiff who neither participated in the adjudication nor was given any opportunity to be
heard."' 8 Justice Kotani, in a concurring opinion, recited the proverb,
"Don't hear one and judge two" (liengen sh5- o danzezu). 1

16. The statute Kainan shimpanh5 (Marine Disaster Inquiry Law), art. 53 (Law
No. 35, 1941) provides that a challenge to the Board's ruling is to be brought in the
Tokyo High Court, rather than in an ordinary district court. A trial de novo is, however, permitted in the High Court, since there is no statutory provision making the
substantial evidence rule applicable. See discussions in note 43 infra, and in text between
notes 52 & 53 infra.
17. "No action (or prosecution), no decision (or trial)" (i.e., adjudicator cannot
decide beyond what was asked) becomes an issue only after judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings have been instituted, Strictly speaking, therefore, this principle does not
directly concern our subject matter; i.e., whether and when a hearing should be held,
but rather how it should be conducted.
18. 15 Minshii at 472. "Inappropriate" (Jut5 or dat6 de nai) is usually used in contrast to "illegal" (ihS), to indicate that the action taken is not desirable but is nevertheless legal.
19. 15 Minshia at 474. Literally it means "Do not decide a case by hearing one-sided
words." This old Chinese proverb does not directly cover the question of the right to
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Justice Fujita, dissenting, criticized the majority's formalistic view
of standing, stating that the plaintiff's business and reputation would
undoubtedly suffer greatly from this official declaration of its negligence, and that a trial court, in possible litigation against the plaintiff,
would be greatly influenced by the findings of fact of this board so
expert in marine matters. Consequently, Justice Fujita would have
supported the High Court's decision vacating the Board's ruling according to the principle of "no action, no decision." 20 Justice Kawamura agreed, expressing his view that this is a "constitutional" principle, but not indicating any specific article embracing it."'
Perhaps even more important, for the purposes of our discussion,
is Justice Tarumi's concurring opinion, which directly confronts the
question of the applicability of Article 31 of the Constitution, and
concludes, largely on the basis of its phraseology, that its requirement
of fair and reasonable process relates only to cases involving a criminal
or quasi-criminal penalty. Since the ruling in question did not legally
(as distinguished from factually) affect the plaintiff's position, it was
not governed by Article 31. However, Justice Tarumi did not indicate
how liberal a construction should be applied to the phrase "quasicriminal penalty," and we might speculate, for example whether it
would, in his view, include a revocation of a license for misbehavior, or
a discharge from public office for misconduct.22
The Supreme Court's attitute respecting the possible application of
Article 31 to quasi-criminal and non-criminal penalties is further illuminated by the decision of the Grand Bench in In re Fukui,23
decided in 1966. This case involved the imposition of a non-criminal
fine (karyo) for failure to register (as required by statute) the name
hearing either except in so far as it suggests that the deciding officer should hear both
sides of the case. See note 17, supra.
20. 19 Minshi at 486. Justice Fujita's opinion might well be compared with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951), arguing that the listing of an organization as "subversive" (placing it on the Attorney General's published list of subversive organizations)
was sufficient injury to require a fair hearing. Although Mr. Justice Frankfurter did
not speak for the court, his opinion is now generally regarded as authoritative.
21. 15 Minshil at 492.

22. 15 Minshil at 474. Justice Shimoiizaka, concurring, vigorously insisted, as in the
Customs Law cases, on the procedural barrier against the discussion of the constitutional
principle on the iterits, suggesting that the complaint was like an arrow shot without a
target. 15 Minshil at 484. Justice Irie simply joined the majority. It is rather disappointing not to have his separate opinion in this case.
23. 20 Minshii 2279 (Supreme Court, Grand Bench, Dec. 2 , 1966).
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of a newly elected director of a foundation. The defendant's principal
objection was that the fine was imposed by the court in a non-contentious proceeding (hisho fiken tetsuzuki), without affording the
open court adversary hearing guaranteed by Articles 82 and 32 of the
Japanese Constitution.2 4 The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
stating that a non-criminal fine is not a "criminal penalty," but an
administrative disposition; and since even an administrative agency
could impose such a fine, the adjudication was not required to be made
after a trial-type hearing in open court. However, since the imposition
of a non-criminal fine is obviously a disadvantageous sanction which
confiscates property, the Court thought it necessary to examine the
operation and fairness of the Non-Contentious Procedure Law.25 The
Court then concluded that the statutory procedure satisfied the Article
31 requirement of due process of law because: (1) it required a court,
rather than the administrative agency concerned (Registrar, Ministry
of Justice), to determine the imposition of the fine as an entirely
neutral arbiter, after deliberate investigation; (2) in principle, the
charged party was given an opportunity to submit a written or oral
statement prior to the decision; (3) if by any chance, the fine were
imposed without such an opportunity, the charged party could make
an objection which would automatically void the decision and force
the court to decide again de novo, after hearing the party's statement;
and (4) the decision had to be accompanied by "reasons," and was
subject to review in a higher court.2 6
Justice Irie, the only dissenter in Fukui, did not disagree with the
view that Article 31 requires a fair hearing before imposition of a
non-criminal or administrative sanction. But he would have gone
further to require that, once the decision in a non-contentious proceeding is challenged by appeal, the proceeding must assume the characteristics of litigation between the fined party and the administrative
agency, to which Articles 32 and 82 apply 7

24.

JAPANESE CONST. art. 82: "Trials shall be conducted and judgment

declared

publicly."
JAPANESE CONST. art. 32: "No person shall be denied the right of access to the courts."

25. Hishyd jiken tetsuzukihi (non-contentious procedure law) (Law No. 14, 1898) in
2 EHS No. 2380.
26. Id., arts. 207, 208-2.
27. 20 Minshfi at 2288.
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On the basis of these cases, we feel justified in concluding that the
Supreme Court of Japan regards Article 31 as embracing a principle
of fair hearing, applicable at least where private individuals are subjected to sanctions which are similar to criminal penalties. Whether
the same attitude would apply to other types of administrative sanctions, in licensing or disciplinary proceedings, is a more debatable
question.
For example, in Kitaya v. Nara Education College, 8 decided by a
Petty Bench of the Supreme Court in 1959, a student who had been
expelled from a public college for cheating on an examination challenged the validity of the sanction on the ground that it was imposed
without giving him an adequate opportunity for hearing. According
to the findings of fact by the trial court, the student had been initially
interrogated by a professor (acting as an advisor to students) and
two assistant professors (acting as student counsellors); he then
signed, as requested, a student inquiry paper recording the questions,
answers, and explanations. Later, he was given an opportunity to appear and speak before the faculty disciplinary committee, and the
final decision was made at a faculty meeting, upon the basis of the
disciplinary committee's recommendation, which in turn had been
based upon the student-inquiry record and the testimony of the examination-supervisor who discovered the cheating. The trial court
dismissed the complaint, saying that the faculty decision was made
on the basis of fair procedures in which the plaintiff was given ample
opportunity to be heard. On appeal to the Supreme Court, counsel
for the student argued that the student inquiry procedure was a routine process which did not constitute a fair hearing, and that the
faculty really decided after hearing only the prosecuting party, i.e.
the examination-supervisor. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of the trial court in a brief opinion which simply stated that the facts
established at trial supported the conclusion that the plaintiff student
had been given a fair opportunity to be heard.
While the Court may have been too cavalier in equating an inquiry
for purposes of investigation with a hearing for the protection of an
accused, it is yet noteworthy that the Supreme Court did not flatly
28. 6 Shrmu Gepp6 1535 (Sup. Ct., 3d Petty Bench, June 28, 1960),
5 Sh6mu Gepp6 1425 (Osaka High Ct., Sept. 5, 1959).

affirming
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reject the student's claim to a fair hearing on the simple ground that
the statute contained no provision requiring such a hearing, as had
the Kyoto District Court in a similar 1955 case.20 On the other hand,
since the Court based its opinion on an examination of the facts, it
may be too much to infer that the Court committed itself therein to
the proposition that a fair hearing must be held before subjecting a
student to serious discipline, even though the opinion apparently indulges that assumption." °
With this background in mind, we return to the licensing cases now
pending before the Supreme Court.

29. Matsuura v. Kokuritsu Kyoto Daigaku Sch6 (President of Kyoto University),
6 Gy6sei reishii 3003 (Kyoto Dist. Ct., Dec. 28, 1955). Here a leader of the radical student
movement (Zengakuren) who had been expelled from the University without a hearing,
challenged the President's disciplinary action. The district court rejected his fair-hearing
argument saying flatly:
Plaintiff argues that the present action is illegal in that it was decided without first
giving him an opportunity to be heard. However, there is no statutory provision
rendering the present disciplinary disposition illegal merely for failure to give him
such opportunity. The foreign proverb referred to by plaintiff, "no man should
be condemned unheard" cannot be accorded in this country the status of primary
authority.
Id. at 3025. The High Court of Sendai took a similar position with respect to a 70-day
suspension of a driver's license without hearing, where the statute required a hearing
only if the suspension was for 90 days or more. Shimazu v. Yamagata-Ken K6an I'inkai
(Yamagata Prefecture Public Safety Commission), 11 Gy6sei reishi 455, 462 (Sendai
High Ct., Feb. 26, 1960). The Kitaya and Matsuura cases may also be compared with
recent American cases holding that students expelled from public universities are entitled
to notice and hearing. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir. 1961).
30. Somewhat but not entirely comparable to the question of the applicability of
Article 31 to administrative proceedings, are the problems involving the applicability
of Article 35 (searches and seizures) and Article 38 (privilege against self-incrimination)
to administrative proceedings. Article 35 provides in part:
The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects against
entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued for
adequate cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to
be seized, or except as provided by Article 33.
Article 33 provides:
No person shall be apprehended except upon warrant issued by a competent judicial
officer which specifies the offense with which the person is charged, unless he is
apprehended, the offense being committed.
See, e.g., Japan v. Masaki, 9 Keishii 924 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, April 27, 1955)
(The Moonshining Case) where some members of the Court thought that Article 35 was
applicable only to criminal enforcement procedures and not to administrative investigatory procedures; and Japan v. Matsumoto, 15 Keishii 1940 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench,
Dec. 20, 1961) (the Red Purge case) where some of the justices thought that the particular
administrative investigation was tantamount to a criminal investigation and therefore
violated Articles 31, 33 and 38, whereas other justices thought that none of these articles
was applicable because the investigation was administrative rather than criminal in nature.
For further discussion of these problems see George, The Right of Silence in Japanese
Law, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 1147, 1161-65 (1968) reprinted in Henderson, supra note 8 at
257, 271-75.

284

Right to Fair Hearing in Japan
H. THE TAXI-CAB CASE AND THE GUMMA BUS CASE
Kawakami, the plaintiff in the Taxi-Cab case, had applied for a
license to operate a so-called individual taxi-cab business. Competition
in this field was intense (6,630 applications for 983 licenses), and his
application was rejected after a hearing pursuant to the Road Transportation Law.3 1 The reason given by the Tokyo Land Transportation
Bureau for the rejection of the application was that the information
it set forth was insufficient to satisfy certain licensing standards
adopted by the Bureau: namely, "(6) that it is not difficult for the
applicant to change his occupation where he is presently engaged in a
business other than a driver, and (7) that the applicant has had more
than seven years experience as a professional driver.""2 However,
these standards had never been made public.
At the time of the hearing, according to the findings of the Tokyo
District Court, Kawakami was running a small miscellaneous-goods
shop, and had not had a driving job for several years. Before he
opened the shop, he had been working as a driver at a U.S. Army
base, but only for five years. Nonetheless, had Kawamaki been informed of the standards, he could have proved (1) that the annual
income from his shop was so small that he was ready at any time to
close it down, and (2) that he had been a driver in the Japanese Army
continuously between 1938 and 1945, which time could have been
counted for purposes of his license application, but which he did not
mention because he believed that the more recent five-year experience
was enough to show his driving skill.
Kawakami instituted suit in the Tokyo District Court under the
Administrative Litigation Act," alleging that the procedure which
31. Dro insulh (Road transportation law) (Law No. 183, 1951), The applicable
provisions were: Art. 122-2
(1) The Land Transportation Bureau Chief may conduct a hearing, whenever
he deems necessary, with respect to the following matters requesting the presence
of the interested parties and references:
(i) Application for a license for an automobile transportation business.
(ii) Suspension and cancellation of such license.
(iii) Approval of basic automobile transportation fares or fees.
(2) The Land Transportation Bureau Chief must conduct a hearing with respect
to the above matters, requesting the presence of the interested parties and references
when requested by the interested parties or instructed by the Minister of Transportation.
32. 14 Gy~sei reishil at 1679. See note 4, supra.
33. Gydseifken sosh~hd (Administrative litigation act) (Law No. 139, 1962) in
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led to denial of his application was unfair and arbitrary because the
licensing standards had not been disclosed so as to enable him to
present the most pertinent and advantageous evidence required at the
hearings. Indeed, surprisingly enough, it was discovered during trial
that the standards in question had been adopted by high ranking staff
members of the Bureau's licensing section after Kawakami's hearing
had started, but had not been systematically communicated to other
staff members. Consequently, some of the hearing examiners including
Kawakami's examiner, did not know about the standards, and simply
asked generalized questions concerning the items appearing in the application form, such as present job, amount of income, family situation, traffic violation record, and the like. After the hearings were
completed, the high-ranking staff members conferred and made the
final decisions, applying the standards.
In disposing of the case, Judge Shiraishi 4 speaking for the Tokyo
District Court, announced two general rules which the licensing process must follow in order to be fair: (1) where the agency chooses
among competing applicants on the basis of fact-findings rather than
by lot, there must be concrete standards prepared before the hearings
and known to all examiners, in order to ensure findings of relevant
facts and equal application of the standards; and (2) where such
standards require subtle judgment, they must also be made known to
the applicants beforehand, so they can attempt to prove all relevant
and favorable facts. Since the agency action in Kawakami's case failed
to meet these requirements, the court set aside the denial of his application as unfair and, therefore, invalid. "
The significance of this decision lies not so much in the outcome of
the litigation as in the reasoning by which the court derived these two
general rules from the Constitution. The District Court first observed
that Article 6 (1) of the Road Transportation Law requires the Bureau
Chief to hold a hearing in certain cases prior to granting or denying
2 EHS No. 2391. This law, which prescribes the general procedure for obtaining judicial
review of administrative action, is discussed in detail in Ogawa, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions in Japan, 43 WASH. L. REv. 1075 (1968), reprinted in Henderson,
supra note 8, at 1185.
34. Judge Shiraishi has commented on both this case and the Gumma Bus case, over
which he also presided, in Shiraishi, Gyoseijiken-sosho no arikita (A New Approach to
Administrative Litigation), HNREs Jmro (No. 428) 3 (1966).
35. 14 Gy6sei reishil at 1676-77.
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a license, and to take into consideration (1) the public need for the
particular transportation service, (2) the need to avoid excessive business competition, and (3) the ability of the particular applicant to
properly operate the business. The statute did not prescribe any
detailed standards for licensing or hearing procedures, obviously leaving these matters to the discretion of the Bureau. But, in the court's
view, the scope of the Bureau's discretion had natural limitations and
boundaries in the Constitution. More particularly, the court held that
the Constitution guarantees the people a right to have their license
applications disposed of with such a degree of due process as to place
the agency's action beyond any reasonable suspicion of arbitrariness.
The heart of the court's reasoning is set forth in this passage: 3 6
It is but natural in light of Article 14 of the Constitution
which established the principle of equality under the law that such
procedures [of selecting a few qualified persons from a large number of applicants] must be fair ones to be applied uniformly and
equally to all applicants. In addition, people's rights and freedom
cannot be complete and substantial without the guaranty of procedures to assert and protect such rights and freedom. Accordingly, Articles 13 and 31 of the Constitution must be interpreted
to mean that people's rights and freedom be respected not only
substantively but also procedurally. To begin with, moreover,
government (administration) is a sacred trust of the people (Constitution Preamble), and the public officials who are in charge of
administration have the obligation of handling their office faithfully as the servants of the whole community and not of any group
thereof, Constitution Article 15. Therefore, although the strictness
and deliberateness of judicial procedures are not required here,
officials have no discretionary freedom to impose upon people the
result of a decision made through such procedures as permit
anybody to suspect their arbitrariness and unfairness as regards
findings of fact in selecting a few individuals from a large number of applicants. Thus, even in instances where there are no
provisions whatsoever relating to the selecting methods and procedures, it must be recognized that a license applicant has a guaranty of his legal interest in having his application disposed of
36. 14 Gy6sel reishfi 1666, at 1675-76. Article 13 of the Constitution provides:
All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the
public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.
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through such fair procedures as would leave no room for reasonable suspicion of arbitrariness in findings of fact.
On appeal by the Tokyo Land Transportation Bureau, the Tokyo
High Court affirmed this ruling. 7 The High Court denied any need
to notify applicants of the detailed standards, but conceded that they
should be informed as to the type of facts which would be deemed
relevant for selecting purposes. Consequently, the High Court held
that the Bureau's action in the instant case was illegal, violating
Kawakami's right to have his application handled with fair procedures,
because more than half of the examiners, including Kawakami's, had
not been informed of the detailed licensing standards, and were incapable of eliciting facts which might be critical to satisfaction of the
standards. The High Court did not comment on the constitutional
basis of the District Court's decision, thus leaving open the question
whether the requirement of fair hearing was based upon some constitutional theory, or upon implication from the statutory provisions.8
Basically the same questions were involved in Gumrna Central Bus
K.K. v. Minister of Transportation,9 which involved bus-line licensing
procedures. In 1956, the plaintiff bus company applied for a license
to operate a long-distance bus line through the main cities in Gumma
Prefecture, to Kusatsu and other famous hot-springs resorts, thus
serving many tourists from Tokyo and other parts of the country. At
the time of plaintiff's application, such tourists were served by the
buses of the Japan National Railways, the Tobu Railway K.K., the
Gumma Bus K.K., and the Kusatsu Electric Railway K.K., which were
all short-line services which terminated at their respective railway

37. 16 Gy6sei reishfi 1585 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 16, 1965).
38. The closest the High Court came to general constitutional theory was in this
sentence:
Because licensing for the individual taxi business concerns the freedom to choose
one's occupation guaranteed by the Constitution as one of the fundamental human
rights (Article 22), the administrative agency that rules on who may engage in a
business, selecting a few persons from many applicants, should at least establish
certain standards for review by amplifying each item of the Road Transportation
Law Article 6(1) [the general statutory standards] concerning the hearing and
review (preconditions to the rulings) and should conduct the hearings and final fact
findings after ensuring that the officials in charge of the hearing fully understand
the content of these standards and the criteria for applying them, in order to guarantee that the procedures are fair and that fact finding is not arbitrary.
16 Gy6sei reishii at 1588.
39. 14 Gy6sei reishfi 2255 (Tokyo District Court, Dec. 25, 1963).
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stations in various cities in the prefecture. Plaintiff's plan was to offer
a convenient "through" transportation service to tourists traveling
long distances.
Upon public notice of the Gumma Central Bus application for a
license for long-distance bus service, the Gummna Bus Company filed a
protest. The Ministry of Transportation acted rather slowly on the
application and protest; three years after the filing of the application,
a public hearing was held by the Transportation Council, an advisory
branch of the Ministry, in accordance with Articles 6 and 16 of the
Law Establishing the Ministry of Transportation.4 The interested
parties-i.e., the applicant and the four existing bus operators-were
allowed to submit their views and to present oral and written arguments. But the Council gave them no indication, prior to the hearing,
of what facts would be deemed relevant to satisfaction of the abstract
standards, such as "public need" and "public interest," set forth in
Article 6 of the Road Transportation Law. Apart from the arguments
presented, there were no trial-type hearing or presentation of evidence.
The Council remained silent for two more years after the 1959
hearing, apparently because it could not reach a decision. In the
meantime, in December of 1960, the President of the Gumma Bus
Company, a Mr, Kogure-the strongest opponent of the applicationbecame the Minister of Transportation, and shortly thereafter the investigating Bureau reached a negative conclusion as regards the application, and on the basis of this view, the Council, in May, 1961,
made a similar negative recommendation to Minister Kogure, who
immediately turned down Gumma Central Bus Company's license application. The reason given for the denial was that existing transportation facilities were more convenient for the public with respect to
schedules, fares, etc., and, therefore, there was no serious public Deed
for the proposed bus service. One month after this decision, there
occurred a long-anticipated reshuffling of the Cabinet, and Mr. Kogure
returned to the Gumma Bus Company, as the chairman of its board of
directors. About the same time, a former high-ranking Bureau official

40. The role of the Transportation Council will be discussed more fully in Part IIIB,
dealing with hearings by administrative councils. For present purposes, it is sufficient
-to note that the statute requires a public hearing on such an application whenever a
protest is filed.
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became the president of the Gumma Bus Company, and another official became an executive director of the Tobu Railway (another
opponent of the plaintiff's application).
Following these developments, the Gumma Central Bus Company
brought suit under the Administrative Litigation Act, seeking revocation of the Minister's adverse decision, and alleging, inter alia, that
the whole decision-making process had been unfair and tainted by
political considerations. The Tokyo District Court, Judge Shiraishi
again presiding, sustained the complaint and reaffirmed the views expressed in the Taxi-Cab case, using identical phraseology to describe
the requirements of due process of law under the Preamble to the
Constitution, as well as Articles 13, 14 and 31. The District Court
regarded as unfair the Council's public hearing procedure, because
the Council had failed to give the parties advance notice of the type
of concrete facts and issues which would be deemed relevant in determining whether the particular application satisfied the abstract statutory requirements of public need and interest. Indeed, in the court's
opinion, the criteria which the Bureau and the Council used to determine public convenience--i.e., schedules, fares, traffic conditions, excessive competition, etc.,-were rather arbitrary and vulnerable to
criticism. The court further observed that the Council's decision and
findings of fact might have been quite different had the parties been
informed of these criteria, challenged their reasonableness, and produced relevant evidence to support their contentions.
Since the agency in charge has very broad statutory discretion as
regards criteria, findings of fact, and final judgment regarding the
public need and interest, the court conceded that the scope of judicial
review must be relatively narrow with respect to the merits (appropriateness) of the Minister's decision. In view of the complex and
technical character of transportation administration, this was inevitable. However, the presence of such broad discretion requires that there
be procedural safeguards to protect the people from abuses of discretion by the agency. Thus, in this context, the main function of the
judiciary was not to ascertain whether there had been an abuse of
discretion on the merits, but rather to safeguard the people's legal
interest in having their license applications disposed of with such a
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degree of due process as to place the agency's action beyond any reasonable suspicion of arbitrariness or political motivation.
This judicial view is remarkable insofar as it suggests a new approach for Japanese courts in litigation regarding today's technical
and complicated service administration. Upon appeal to the Tokyo
High Court, however, the District Court's decision was reversed, and
the complaint was dismissed.41 The District Court's procedural approach to administrative litigation seems to have been largely rejected
by the High Court, which was primarily concerned with the merits
(appropriateness) of the agency decision. First, the High Court characterized the bus business as a public enterprise closely related to
public welfare and safety, not a private enterprise comprehended by
the freedom of occupation guaranteed in Article 22 of the Constitution.42 Therefore, a license for a bus line was a privilege rather than
a right, and the agency in charge had a strict duty to carefully examine license applications from the standpoint of public need and
public interest as required by law. Second, the High Court (which is,
in part, a second trial court in Japan) 43 examined whether in fact there
had been an abuse of discretion when the Minister of Transportation
rejected the plaintiff's application. The court found that the Minister's
judgments concerning schedules, fares, traffic conditions (safety), public demand, etc., were sound. Third, the High Court stated that the
fact that the then Minister Kogure and other high-ranking officials
had a special personal interest in denial of the application could not
41. 18 Gy~sei reishii 1014 (Tokyo High Ct., July 25, 1967).
Among the specific contentions noted and rejected by the High Court was the objection that not all of the members of the Council who participated in the recommendation
had attended the hearing or heard the evidence. In fact the transcript of the hearing
was lost and could not be read by new members of the Council. The Court seemed to
think it a sufficient answer to point out that the new members could have asked for
such additional information as they thought, important. Compare First Morgan Case
and some of its progeny. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); and cases
collected in L. JA= & N. NATHANsoN, ADMfmSTRAmEVa LAw 948-52 (3d ed. 1968).
42. Art. 22 provides:
Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his
occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare.
43. An ordinary civil case is tried first in a District Court. The defeated party can
appeal as of right to a High Court. This appeal, called ktso, is, in part, a second instance,
or continued trial (zokushin). The findings of fact of the District Court do not bind the
High Court, which may also hear whatever additional evidence the parties wish to offer.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, is a true "appellate court" in the Anglo-American
sense.
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alone justify revocation of the Minister's decision. The mere suspicion
that they might have conspired and decided the case on the basis of
improper private or political considerations was unproven and therefore irrelevant. Then the court examined the evidence and concluded
that Minister Kogure's decision had been based on the opinion of the
Bureau, which had great expertise in transportation regulation.
Fourth, the court held that, although the Minister must consider
its recommendation, the Transportation Council is merely an advisory
organ (shimon-kikan), and not a "participating organ" (sanyo-kikan)
so far as the decision-making process is concerned. Therefore, its
recommendation was not binding upon the Minister, and even if there
was some substantive or procedural error underlying the Council's
recommendation, the final independent decision of the Minister would
not be tainted by such error. The High Court also ruled that the Council was under no obligation to notify the parties, prior to the public
hearing, of the relevance of certain facts and issues so as to encourage
them to produce all relevant evidence. Inasmuch as the licensing here
involved was a granting of privilege rather than right, the Council
could properly base its conclusions on statements and other materials
submitted by the parties, who knew well the necessity of convincing
the agency of the existence or non-existence of a public need for, and
public interest in, the proposed business plan. If those materials were
not sufficient, the Council could yet conduct any additional ex officio
investigation as it might deem proper, but it was under no duty to do
so. Thus, the court found no procedural defect in the public hearing.
That the Council had made its recommendation after consulting with
the Bureau was consistent with long-established custom, and was to
be praised rather than condemned, because the Bureau is a master of
the technical, specialized, and complicated problems of transportation
administration. Moreover, the court said, considering the high personal
qualifications of the Council members, such consultation involved no
danger of affecting the independence and fairness of the Council's
unbiased judgment.
Finally, the High Court expressed its hope that the agency in performing its duty, would keep in mind the policies expressed by the
Tokyo District Court, which were worthy of serious consideration.
But the High Court did not go so far as to agree with the District
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Court's interpretation of Article 31 of the Constitution regarding the
application of due process of law in this type of licensing case.
It is unclear whether or not the High Court agreed with the District
Court's general interpretation of Article 31, and related articles, even
apart from their application to this type of case. Thus the High Court
in the Gumrna Bus case, as in the Taxi-Cab case, avoided coming to
grips with the fundamental constitutional theories developed by the
District Court concerning the right to fair hearing in administrative
proceedings. Both cases are now pending in the Supreme Court.
Whether that court will choose to follow the path of the Tokyo District Court, or that of the Tokyo High Court, is naturally most interesting to all of us who are concerned with the future development
of Japanese administrative and constitutional law. Before speculating
on such possibilities, we turn to a survey of the general nature of hearings in Japanese administrative proceedings.

III. ACTUAL NATURE AND CONDITION OF HEARINGS
UNDER VARIOUS STATUTES
As the history of the American administrative hearing system illustrates, recognition of the constitutional right to fair hearing by way
of due process of law does not solve all the problems of administrative
proceedings. Even if we assume that Articles 31, 13, and 14 of the
Japanese Constitution comprehend the American concept of due process of law, uncertainty still remains as to whether, and what type of,
a hearing must be accorded in each particular case. Absent any accumulation of judicial decisions (which Japan simply lacks) indicating
criteria for concrete application of the general principle, examination
of the constitutional basis for the right to an administrative hearing
does not offer much guidance to the practitioner.
Indeed, almost every administrative action affects people's rights
and interests, but no one asserts that a full, trial-type hearing is always
required as part of the administrative process. Thus, even Justice Irie,
the most forthright proponent of due process in the Customs Law
cases, did not regard Article 31 as requiring notice and hearing every
time people's rights and interests may be affected by the State; instead, he suggested case-by-case differentiations according to the na-
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ture of each particular administrative action.4 4 Judge Shiraishi also
conceded, in both the Taxi-Cab case and the Gumma Bus case, that
the concrete ingredients of "such due process as would leave no reasonable suspicion of arbitrariness on the part of the agency in charge"
could not be determined without taking into account various factors
such as the purposes and nature of the particular administrative action, the nature of the rights and interests to be affected by that
action, and the characteristics of the particular agency involved.45
Furthermore, the content of the constitutional principle of due process of law in administrative proceedings cannot be concretely developed wholly apart from the context of statutory provisions which
shape the contours of such administrative action. It would be too
dangerous to ask each agency in charge to judge whether, and what
type of, a hearing is constitutionally required for each particular action. Thus, at the moment, we must look into the statutory environment to get a realistic picture of the present condition of the Japanese
administrative hearing system.
According to the Special Commission for Investigating [the Present
Condition and the Future Reform of] Administration (Rinji Gyosei
Chosakai), there are 481 articles (in 227 statutes) requiring hearings
in 764 types of administrative dispositions. These provisions cover
practically all adjudicatory administrative actions,4 6 and justify the
44. See 14 Keish-i at 1584-1585; 16 Keishii at 1599-1600.
45. See 14 Gy6sei reishfil at 1676; 14 Gy6sei reishii at 2306.
46. See note 3, supra. There are some agency actions for which the legislature has
not prescribed hearings; for example: cancellation of a license to manufacture airplanes
or their parts (K~kfiki seizoku jigy~hd (Airplane manufacturing enterprise law) (Law
No. 237, 1952), arts. 2-13); to do construction work in a bay or harbor (Kiwan ho
(Bays and harbors law) (Law No. 218, 1950), art. 37-3); to operate an employment
exchange project (Shokugy5 anteihd (Employment stability law) (Law No. 141, 1947),
art. 50).
In those instances, the parties affected may file objections and seek revocation of the
agency actions taken against them. (Objections may be filed, of course, even where there
is a guaranteed hearing prior to agency actions.) In dealing with such an objection,
there is provision for oral as well as written presentation of evidence under the Gyisei
fujuku shinsah6 (Administrative appeal law) (Law No. 160, 1962) arts. 25 and 26, and
other special statutes like the Kokka k6muinho (National public servants law) (Law
No. 120, 1947) arts. 89-92, the Dempah5 (Radio law) (Law No. 131, 1950) arts. 83-96,
as amended. The scope of our present inquiry is not intended to cover, except inddentally, the hearing procedures in such post disposition cases. As to the relationship
between proceedings under the Administrative Appeal Law (administrative review) and
administrative litigation (judicial review), see generally, Ogawa, Judicial Review of
Administrative Actions in Japan, 43 WAsHr. L. REV. 1075, 1091 (1968), reprinted in Henderson, supra note 8 at 185, 201. We were told that in 1966, 56,685 cases were filed
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conclusion that, so far as statutory provisions are concerned, the administrative hearing has been established in Japan as a general procedure, notwithstanding controversies over its constitutional basis.
These statutory provisions were enacted after the war, apparently
under American influence. Our task here is to ascertain whether this
post-war legal transplantation has been successful in practice, and how
well Japanese administrators have assimilated the Anglo-American
hearing system into their traditional Continental-type of authoritative
administration.
A. Hearing by Administrative Commissions
An especially conspicuous phenomenon in post-war Japan's administrative law was the establishment of so-called administrative
commissions (gyosei-i'inkai), such as the Fair Trade Commission,
the Labor Relations Board (National and Prefectural), the Personnel Board (National), the Personnel Commission (Prefectural),
47
the Public Safety Commissions (National and Prefectural) and others
These commissions were intended to act more-or-less independently
of the Cabinet, Ministries, and other related administrative agencies,
and to exercise quasi-judicial as well as quasi-legislative functions.48
Undoubtedly, this American type of commission was introduced in the
hope of halting the Japanese tradition of centrally-controlled, authoritative administration, by decentralizing the decision-making process

under the Administrative Appeal (Complaint) Law. Of these 47,202 were tax appeals.
Interview with officials of Administrative Management Bureau, May 26, 1969.
47. For a history of the establishment and decline of administrative commissions, see
Wada, Gyjsei-iinkai (Administrative commissions), Julsiro 70 (No. 361, 1967); Kawakami, Gycsei-Finkai, 4 GY6SSH6-K~zA 50 (Administrative Law Lecture Series, 1965).
48. Examples of rule-making hearings by administrative commissions are: specifications of unfair trade practices (FTC: Shitekl dok sen no kinshi oyobi k1seitorihiki no
kakuho ni kansuruh6 (Law concerning prohibition of private monopoly and preservation of fair trade practice [popularly known as Anti-Monopoly Law]) (Law No. 54,
1947), art. 71); designation of a mining-prohibited area (LUAC: Tochi chasei finkai
setchih5 (Land Use Adjustment Commission Law) (Law No. 292, 1950), art. 23). Sometimes, administrative councils will conduct such public hearings: designation of a cultural
properties protection area (CPPC: Bunkazai hogoh5 (Cultural property protection law)
(Law No. 214, 1950), art. 85(1)iii); fares of bus, railway, airline (Transportation
Council: Unyushi setchihO (Transportation ministry law) (Law No. 57, 1949), arts. 6,
16) ; radio regulatory rules (RRC: Radio law art. 99-12, supra note 46). Regarding public
hearings for such quasi-legislative purposes, see generally, Takayanagi, Gy6sei-shimpan
(Administrative adjudication), 3 Gy6s 6 K&A 98 (Administrative Law Lecture Series,

1965).
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and by giving an opportunity for fair hearing to the parties involved
in certain agency actions.
The hearings afforded by these administrative commissions are
satisfactory on the whole, even by Anglo-American standards. A typical example is the procedure of the Fair Trade Commission. A party
charged with violation of the Law concerning Prohibition of Private
Monopoly and Preservation of Fair Trade Practice has a right to be
notified, to appear, and to defend (with or without the aid of counsel)
in an open hearing, where he is entitled to produce evidence and crossexamine adverse witnesses. Decisions must be given in writing, and
must set forth the reasons which support them, i.e., findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The FTC decisions are published and reported
annually. Moreover, the private party may appeal an adverse decision
to the Tokyo High Court, and the findings of fact by the FTC will
bind the court where there is "substantial evidence" to support
them. 9
The FTC's statutory hearing is the most formal trial-type hearing
in Japan. However, it is noteworthy that most parties charged by the
FTC simply accept its recommendations (advisory decisions, kankokuslzinketsu) to cease monopolization or unfair trade practices, without
resort to the guaranteed formal proceedings. Thus the traditional and
informal "administrative guidance," widely practiced by the ministries
controlling the Japanese economy, has penetrated the practice of even
the administrative commissions. ° Rather exceptional was the recent
Yawata-Fuji Steel merger case, wherein Japan's two largest steel companies refused to accept the FTC's advice, and requested a formal
adjudication as to the illegality of the proposed merger plan."' But
even when such formal proceedings are instituted, in most cases the

49. See the Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 48, ch. VIII, arts. 27-76, and ch. IX,
arts. 77-88-2.
50. As to "administrative guidance," see Part III (C) Hearings by Ordinary Administrative Agencies, infra. In detail, see Narita, Administrative Guidance, 2 LAW IN JAPAN 45
(1968); Symposium, Gydsei-shido no kihon-mondai (Basic problems of administrative
guidance), JURISUTo 21 (No. 342, 1966).
51. The details of the Yawata-Fuji Merger case were continuously reported by the
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Newspaper), International Weekly Edition.
Particularly the issues of May 13, 1969 at 1-2 and May 20, 1969 at 2. Even here,
however, after some weeks of formal hearing, apparently accompanied by further negotiations, a "consent decision" was reached permitting the merger on certain conditions.
Id. issues of Oct. 21, 1969, at 2, and Oct. 31, 1969, at 1, 4.
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parties apply for "decision by consent" (d t-shinketsu), thus avoiding
the trial-type hearing.
The organic structure and hearing procedures of the Land Use
Adjustment Commission are very similar to those of the FTC. LUAC's
main activities are (1) designation of prohibited areas for mining,
(2) disposition of objections to mining licenses or the use and expropriation of land for mining, and (3) adjudication of conflicts between
proposed uses of land for public purposes (e.g., parks, water-gathering
grounds, protective forests) and private purposes (e.g., agriculture,
mining). The LUAC adjudicatory hearing is practically quite similar
to a judicial trial, applying, mutatis mutandis, many articles of the Code
of Civil Procedure. An appeal from the Commission's decision must
be taken to the Tokyo High Court, and its findings of fact bind the
court if they are supported by "substantial evidence."' 2
However, the "substantial evidence" rule is applied only in appeals
from decisions made by the FTC, LUAC, and the Radio Regulatory
Council. Adjudications by the Patent Board and the High Marine
Disasters Inquiry Board are subject to a judicial trial de novo in the
Tokyo High Court, which employs trial-type proceedings. Some scholars have argued that, inasmuch as the object of such a suit against an
52. Some scholars believe that the rule of substantial evidence is not as strict in Japan
as it is in the United States, and that Japanese courts have often inquired more freely
into the appropriateness of the findings of fact by the commissions. An example sometimes mentioned is Kokura-shi v. Tochi Chsei Pinkai (Kokura City v. LUAC), 5 Gy6sei
reishii 1690 (Tokyo High Ct., July 7, 1954), where LUAC's decision was set aside as
unsupported by substantial evidence. The Fukuoka Division of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry [hereinafter cited as MITI] had granted a license for the
Toyokuni Cement K.K. to prospect for lime within the boundaries of the city of Kokura.
The city filed an objection alleging that there was a serious danger of destroying or
causing deterioration of its water-gathering ground. LUAC decided in favor of
MITI and the cement company. In LUAC's adjudicative proceedings, two experts were
called. One of them just stated: "I cannot positively say as regards the question of
whether the present gathering ground will be dried up as a result of the prospecting, but
I guess there might be no danger." Another expert said: "I do not believe that th6
prospecting will affect the water unless the digging extends within 300 meters in diameter
of the presently used gathering ground." Id. at 1693. Although there was no guarantee
that the cement company would refrain from extending its prospecting to that area which
was included in the license, LUAC relied on the testimony of a MITI official that administrative guidance would be properly applied. The Tokyo High Court held that
LUAC's conclusion that there was no danger of affecting the City's water condition was
untenable for lack of substantial evidence in the record; in view of the grave consequences which the prospecting might cause to the public health, the inconclusive experts'
opinions and the company's self-restraint through administrative guidance could not be
heavily relied upon. The Supreme Court affirmed the high court's ruling. 16 Minshfi 781
(Sup. Ct., 1st Petty Bench, April 1Z, 1962). Query whether the result would be likely to
be any different in U.S. practice?
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administrative commission or board is to judge whether its particular
adjudication was rightly decided, new allegations and new evidence
should not be admitted at the trial de novo." Nonetheless, the case
law clearly holds that, in the absence of statutory provision for application of the substantial evidence rule, new allegations and evidence
can be introduced freely in the judicial trial.5 4
This opportunity to retry completely a case in court may influence
parties to refrain from presenting all their allegations and evidence
in the administrative hearing, thus detracting from the quasi-judicial
function of administrative commissions. This danger is especially
evident in the case of the Labor Relations Boards. The Central and
Prefectual Labor Relations Boards were established in 1946, and
were further developed by the Labor Union Law of 1949. They each
consist of 21 members (or 15, in the case of several prefectural
boards) appointed by the Minister of Labor Relations (or by the
Governor in the case of a prefectural board). One-third of the members are appointed pursuant to the recommendation of employers' associations, and another one-third, according to the preference of labor
unions. The remaining one-third-called "public-interest members"are appointed upon the approval of the other two-thirds of the appointees. The Labor Boards are empowered, inter alia, to enjoin unfair
labor practices by employers, and to mediate or arbitrate labor disputes. Their adjudicatory functions are mainly executed by the neutral, public-interest members, after consultation with the other
members who represent the interests of either side. In the case of unfair labor practices, the parties (i.e., employer and employee) are
guaranteed a full trial-type hearing in which they have a right to
produce evidence and cross-examine witnesses. 55
53. See Kaneko, Shinketsu no shiho-shinsa (judicial review of administrative adjudications), in Sosu6 TO sAIBAN (Litigation and trial), IWAMATSU SAIBANKA-N KANREKI
KrmN
(In commemoration of the Sixtieth birthday of Justice Iwamatsu) 457-469
(1956).
54. Japan (State) v. Chris R6d5 I'inkai (Central Labor Relations Board), 10 R6d6
kankei minji saiban reishi [hereinafter cited as R6d6 reishil] 505 (Tokyo High Ct.,
June 16, 1959); Osawa v. Tokkyoch5 Ch6kan (Patent Board Chief), 4 Gy6sei reishfi
2424 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 16, 1953). Cf. Kureha v. Patent Board Chief, 6 Gy6sei reishOi 2007
(Tokyo High Ct., Aug. 9, 1955).
55. Rjd&Kvmiaiho (Labor Union Law) arts. 19-27 (Law No. 174, 1949). This is
illustrated by the decision in Ibikawa Denki K6gy5 K.K. v. Gifu-Ken R6d6 I'inkai (Ibikawa
Electric Industry K.K. v. Gifu Labor Relations Board), 2 R6d5 reishi 215 (Gifu Dist.
Ct., July 11, 1950), where the board issued an order to the plaintiff company to retract
a dismissal of an employee, which it viewed as an unfair labor practice. The ruling
was based on testimony and other evidence taken and examined in the investigation
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But because unfair labor practice disputes are also directly actionable in an ordinary district court, employees often tend to bring their
cases before such a court rather than a labor board. This is not surprising, since the courts possess more efficient means for providing
immediate relief. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a district court
can issue an order of temporary (but, in effect, sometimes final) disposition (dank'i no karishobun) for payment of wages provided the dismissed worker shows cause (somei, offering some credible proof, as
distinguished from sh~mei, presentation of evidence at the trial). 56 A
decision of a Labor Board, on the other hand, is subject to judicial
review by a district court (not a high court), and the Board's findings
of fact are not binding upon the court; in short, review will be a trial
de novo. Under these circumstances, it is rather surprising that parties
ever bring unfair labor practice cases to the Labor Board at all.5 7 At
any rate, in order to enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the
proceedings, without giving the adverse party an opportunity to rebut and cross-examine.
The court set aside the board's order as violating the Labor Union Law Article 27(1),
which requires a trial-type hearing in order for the board to take action respecting an
unfair labor practice.
56. As to the important role of temporary disposition in a labor case, see particularly,
Sonobe, RMd6-karshobun-Honso to no kankei (Temporary disposition in labor caserelationship between [the petition for the temporary disposition] and the principal suit),
JuRxsuTo 252 (No. 361, 1967); Sawa, Karishobun no hon'anka (Petition for temporary
disposition taking over principal suit) in Sos116 To SAIBAN, supra note 53, at 377. An
example of this type of relief may be found in George v. International Air Service Co.,
16 R6d5 reishil 308 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., April 26, 1965), English Translation, 10 JAPAN
AwmuAL or INTERNATioNAL LAW 189 (1966), involving an American pilot dispatched in
1961 to Japan Air Lines from the International Air Service Co., a California corporation.
George, the pilot, was dismissed on account of a labor dispute. While a petition was
pending before the appropriate labor board in the United States, asserting that the dismissal constituted an unfair labor practice, he brought another petition before the Tokyo
District Court seeking payment of his salary by way of the abovementioned "temporary
disposition," recognized under the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure. Totally disregarding
the United States labor board's proceeding (partly because International failed to raise
the issue), the Japanese court sustained the petition and ordered International to pay
the salary due.
57. Despite these drawbacks the caseload of the labor boards with respect to unfair
labor practice cases is substantial and increasing. We were told, for example, that two
years ago the Central Labor Relations Board had only 60 unfair labor practice cases
per year, whereas they now have 90 cases a month. (Interview with Chairman Ishii of
the Central Labor Relations Board, May 21, 1969.) We were also told that there were
approximately 140 cases pending before the Tokyo Prefectural Board, that 70 or 80 were
settled annually by decision or withdrawal, that the losing party in such cases can either
appeal to the Central Labor Board or' go directly to court, and that losing employers
prefer to go directly to court, while losing employees prefer to appeal to the Central
Labor Relations Board. (Interview with Chairman Tsukamoto of Tokyo Labor Relations
Board, April 24, 1969.) Of course, these figures are very small compared with the caseload of the US. National Labor Relations Board. Chairman Ishii also agreed with the
desirability of a legislative change in the method of judicial review.
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Labor Boards, at least with respect to unfair labor practices, there
should be some legislative restructuring to establish a more reasonable
relationship between the Boards and the courts.
Another area where the right to fair administrative hearing is theoretically well-established is in disciplinary proceedings before the
Personnel Commissions. 5 8 But here again there are indications of substantial shortcomings in practice. For example, in Kusaka v. OkayamaKen Jinji I'inkai (Kusaka v. Okayama Prefecture Personnel Commission)," a Petty Bench of the Supreme Court held that the parties
had no right to inspect the administrative record. The plaintiff, a public servant of Okayama Prefecture, had been dismissed in 1952, after
which he appealed to the Prefecture's Personnel Commission. In 1956,
pending the appeal, he petitioned for inspection of a relevant part of
the Commission's record, which the Commission permitted. In 1957,
still pending the appeal, he again applied for inspection of the Commission's record; this time, however, the Commission refused his request. The plaintiff then brought suit in the Okayama District Court
demanding that the Commission's refusal be set aside as violative of
Article 31 of the Constitution and the principle of open, public hearing.
The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Hiroshima High
Court followed suit. The Supreme Court, Justice Tanaka presiding,
affirmed the High Court's decision and relied on the same reasoning.
First, the Court conceded: 60
The hearing procedures of the Personnel Commission are to
guarantee the deliberateness as well as the rationality of the hearing and the decision. The record thereof is to note and to publicly
evidence the processes and the results of the procedures. Therefore, from the standpoint of procedural fairness and justice in
the most strict sense, it is desirable that the parties be given
an opportunity to inspect the record and take exceptions as regards [the correctness of] the record so that the hearing pro-

58. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Personnel Commissions, under
Article 17 of the Public Service Law, have subpoena powers, unlike the United States
Civil Service Commission, which does not have such power. We were also told by Mr.
Tatsuo Sato, Chairman of the National Personnel Authority, that in disciplinary proceedings secret evidence was not used and that adverse witnesses were required to appear
if the charged party wished to examine them. Interview, April 23, 1969.
59. 18 Minshfl 1619 (Supreme Court, 3rd Petty Bench, Oct. 13, 1964).
60. 18 Minshil at 1621.
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cedures may be conducted duly and fairly and the record may
reflect the procedures correctly.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that it is a question of legislative
policy whether the party is to be given a right to inspect an administrative record: 61
In the hearing by the Personnel Commission, the one who filed the
appeal and requested a hearing is in a position to be able to know
whether the procedures are conducted duly and fairly, since he is
participating in the proceedings as the party. On the other hand,
the Commission's record is not, in the absence of special provisions, the absolute evidence of the procedures like the record of
litigation procedures. The Commission's record can be supplemented or contested by counter-evidence. Therefore, we do not
think that the guarantee of such right to inspect the record of
the Commission's hearing procedures is absolutely necessary. We
rather think that whether to give to the party such right or not is
a matter of legislative policy. Especially, since the party can
invoke judicial review of the Commission's decision on the ground
of a procedural fault if the outcome of the hearing would have
been different but for that particular procedural fault, the protection of the party's interests is not necessarily insufficient.
Accordingly, we cannot say that it is unconstitutional for the
legislature not to accord to the party the right to inspect the
Commission's record.
In essence, the Supreme Court was saying that a party must wait
until the Commission issues its final decision on the merits of his appeal; if the decision is unfavorable to him, he can then institute a
suit against the Commission on various grounds, including any procedural errors which might have affected the outcome of his appeal.
However, in this particular case, the plaintiff's request for inspection
of the record came four-and-a-half years after the filing of his appeal
(and five years after his dismissal). Furthermore, upon judicial review,
the plaintiff would have the burden of proving procedural fault in
the Commission's hearing (if any), and establishing that such fault
affected the outcome of the appeal. Certainly an administrative record
is not "absolute evidence" and is subject to supplementation and rebuttal, but if that record omits or distorts certain procedural facts,
61.

18 Minshfi at 1621-22.
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it would be extremely hard for the private party to prove contradictory
facts. As the courts conceded, the record is intended by law to publicly evidence the Commission's procedures; accordingly, a court will
heavily rely on it whenever a dispute arises as to procedural facts.
The Commission's main concern in this case was that the record
contained some confidential information concerning other persons'
cases. But the plaintiff asked to see only the part of the record related
to his case. Since the law requires that the hearing must be open if
the party so requests, and that the Commission must keep a record, 2
it would not be difficult for the courts to construe the law so as to
entitle the party to inspect the record. Otherwise, the Supreme Court's
first statement (quoted above), regarding procedural fairness and
justice, sounds like mere lip-service. As Judge Shiraishi observed in
the Taxi-Cab case and the Gumma Bus case, in a democratic society
it is critically important for the party to be convinced psychologically
that his case is being handled fairly, in a manner free from even suspicion of unjust and arbitrary treatment. Surely the party who is refused permission to see the record will become confirmed in suspicions
regarding the fairness of the procedures and the correctness of the
record. Unfortunately, the Japanese higher courts still seem unimpressed by such considerations.
B. Hearing by Administrative Councils
Administrative Councils (gy5sei shingikai) are, in most cases, an
attenuated form of those post-war independent administrative commissions which were deprived of their final decision-making power
after Japan regained its independence in 1952. Instead they were then
relegated to an advisory status by statutory provisions which require
the responsible Minister to consult with the appropriate council before
making a final decision, and to give due respect to its recommendation. 3
However, the hearing procedures which typified those earlier Com62. Chihi kmuinhi (Local public servants law) arts. 11(3), 50(1) (Law No.
261, 1950).
63. As to the decline of administrative commissions and the appearance of administrative councils in their places, see Wada, Gy6sei-Finkai (Administrative commissions),
JJRIsUTO 70 (No. 361, 1967); Kawakami, Gy~sei-i'inkai (Administrative commissions),
4 Gy6sEm6 K6zA 50 (Administrative Law Lectures Series, 1965).

302

Right to Fair Hearing in Japan
missions have theoretically, at least, escaped abolition. A full, trialtype hearing is required by the Radio Law, for instance, when the
Radio Regulatory Council deals with an objection to the licensing of
a radio or television station by the Minister of Postal [and Communications] Services. Although the final disposition of the objection is
made by the Minister, he must base his decision on the RRC's tentative decision (kettei-an)." Inasmuch as the Minister's written opinion
must include findings of fact by the RRC, its tentative decision apparently will be practically binding on him, so far as the facts are
concerned. The final decision may be appealed to the Tokyo High
Court (not to a district court), and that court is also bound by the
RRC's findings of fact if there is substantial evidence in the record
to support them. Thus, despite the change of the RRC's status from an
independent commission to an advisory council, its proceedings (of
the FTC type) have theoretically survived the 1952 revision of the
Radio Law.
In practice, however, the decline of the commission system has
naturally been accompanied by a diminution in the importance of such
hearings. In some instances, including licensing, the Radio Law provides that the RRC may hold a hearing whenever it deems one necessary, before making its recommendation to the Minister. Some writers
have argued that "may" should be read "shall," when the parties involved request a hearing. 5 However, as the following case indicates,
since the 1952 statutory revision the RRC has not once convened such
a discretionary hearing, even when such a hearing was requested by
the interested parties. Most licensing cases are really decided by the
Radio Regulatory Bureau, without substantial review by the RRC
whose recommendations are formed after consultation with the Bureau,
as in the case of the Transportation Council; thus conflicts of opinion
between the Council and the Bureau are avoided.
Chfi Kyjiku Terebi K.K. v. YJisei-Daijin (Central Education
T.V.K.K. v. Minister of Postal Services) (the Twelfth T.V. Channel
case), decided by a Petty Bench of the Supreme Court on December 24,

64. Dempah6 (Radio Law) arts. 83-99(13) (Law No. 131, 1950).
65. See Takagi, Gydsei shobunzen no ch~mon in 2 S=m6KENSHIJ O S6RITSU JfOoSaOntm-Ku;aN Raonux-SHcO, supra note 14, at 19.
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1968,6 is illustrative of the present condition of RRC hearing procedures. The 12th T.V. Channel was relinquished by the U.S. Army
in 1962, and the Japanese Government thereafter reserved the channel
exclusively for scientific and technological education programs. Five
applicants competed for the channel license, and pursuant to the Radio
Law, the Minister submitted the case to the RRC for its recommendation on November 9, 1962. However, prior to this submission, the
Asahi Shimbum (Japan's largest newspaper) had reported (on July 13,
1962) Minister Sakomizu's statement to newsmen that "I think it
appropriate to grant the license to a non-profit organization. I assume
that the Radio Regulatory Council will also recommend that the license
be granted to a non-profit organization." Of the five applicants for the
license, only one was a non-profit organization, namely the Japan
Science and Technology Development Foundation. The four others
were all kabushiki-kaisha (k.k.), private business companies. In addition, two of the five members of the Radio Regulatory Council were
then directors of the non-profit Foundation. Thus, consultation with
and recommendation by the RRC appeared to be simply a formality.
Indeed, the Minister's formal written request of November 9, 1962,
for the RRC's recommendation read as folows:67
Re: Granting the [12th T.V. Channel] license to the Japan
Science and Technology Development Foundation whose application satisfies the requirements of the Radio Law in the judgment
[of the Bureau], and Rejecting other applications which do not
satisfy the requirements ...
The members of the RRC and their examiners apparently reaffirmed
this decision by merely reading through the application forms and
their attachments, and despite the applicants' requests for a hearing,
none was held. Four days later, the RRC made the recommendation
anticipated by the Bureau, and on the same day, the Minister decided
in accordance with the recommendation to grant the license to the
Foundation and to reject other applications, including that of the
Central Education T.V. K.K.

66. 22 Minshfi 3254 (Sup. Ct. 3rd Petty Bench, Dec. 24, 1968) aff'g 16 Gy6sei reishil
1266 (Tokyo High Ct., June 1, 1965).
67. 16 Gy6sei reishii at 1277.
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Central filed objections, and the Minister again submitted the case
to the RRC pursuant to the Radio Law, which explicitly requires a
trial-type hearing at this stage of the proceeding. Central alleged in
its written objections that the RRC and the Minister had erred in
finding that the Foundation was better qualified than Central, and
that there had been procedural unfairness in the decision-making
process, especially in the RRC's denial of Central's request for an
opportunity to be heard. In the RRC hearing on these objections, the
Council apparently did not receive evidence concerning which of the
two applicants (Foundation or Central) was better qualified, especially
as regards financial stability, to efficiently operate the unprofitable
educational television enterprise. Counsel for the Ministry argued at
the hearing that the Minister had favored the'Foundation because (1)
it had submitted a written pledge that it had sufficient financial resources in the form of contributions from cooperative private companies, and (2) it was taking certain steps to secure a continuous
inflow of such contributions, and was implementing other concrete
financial measures. Central contested this allegation, but the RRC did
not ask or require counsel for the Minister to present evidence regarding those "certain steps" and other "concrete financial measures."
Instead, the Council simply examined the allegations of both parties
and concluded that "The question of financial resources for the unprofitable enterprise of education television is a matter of future
speculation. Therefore, the crucial test is which applicant has produced
more concrete evidence to show such resources. Judging from this test,
it was reasonable for the Minister to have found relative preference
for the Foundation rather than Central.""" Thus, the Council tentatively overruled Central's objection, even though it could not show
what, if any, "more concrete evidence" had been produced by the
Foundation.
The Minister overruled Central's objection, in keeping with the
RRC's tentative decision. As required by the Radio Law, the Minister's
decision contained a column entitled "Findings of Fact by the Radio
Regulatory Council;" these "findings" simply reiterated the contradictory allegations of the Minister's counsel and the complaining
68. See 16 Gy6sei reishii at 1309.
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applicant, Central. Central then brought suit in the Tokyo High Court.
Referring both to the United States Constitution and the Federal
Communications Act, Central argued that the Minister's original decision rejecting its application had violated the principle of "no adverse action without a hearing." The defendant Minister replied that
any hearing prior to the original licensing decision is discretionary, and
that, since the 1952 change in the RRC's status, such hearings had
never been held by the RRC regardless of the parties' requests, because the law providing for the hearings employs the term "may"
rather than "must."
However, the Tokyo High Court did not discuss this particular
issue, since it sustained Central's complaint for the simple reason that
the Minister's decision overruling Central's objection had not contained "Findings of Fact by the RRC," as required by the Radio Law.
The court held that the "findings" set forth by the Minister did not
show any concrete facts (as distinguished from allegations) established
by substantial evidence, sufficient to convince ordinary people and
unsuccessful applicants that the RRC's judgment (or the Minister's
decision based on it) was fair and reasonable. 9 Further, the court
refused to decide the case de novo upon its own findings of fact.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tokyo High Court's decision on the
same reasoning, holding that the Minister's decision did not contain
the concrete sort of fact-findings contemplated by the law, particularly
as to the comparative qualifications of the applicants. The Court also
held that, although the Radio Law lacks provisions like those of the
Anti-Monopoly Law (Article 81) which expressly prohibit the court
from receiving new evidence, the intent of the former is the same as
the latter: that is, as far as facts are concerned, the reviewing court
may not try the case de novo or supply findings of fact which the
administrator has failed to make. Hopefully, this case will become
leading authority for the proposition that, when a statute requires a
full trial-type hearing, it is not sufficient to merely observe the formalities of a hearing without actual examination of evidence; that instead
the decision-maker and his advisory council must examine the evidence
sufficiently to make findings which are concrete enough to convince the
69.

306

16 Gy6sei reishi at 1297.

*Rightto Fair Hearing in Japan
parties and the general public that the particular administrative action
is based on fair proceedings and good reasons.
Despite its promising outcome, the facts of the Channel 12 case
illustrate the inevitable disintegration of hearing procedures associated
with an advisory council whose independence is more theoretical than
real. The Transportation Council, whose hearing procedures were questioned in the Gumma Bus case, supra, is another example. The Japanese Government rejected GHQ's post-war suggestion that transportation matters be governed by an independent commission comparable
to the United States Interstate Commerce Commission. Instead, the
Advisory Transportation Council resulted from a compromise, and its
independence was questionable from the start. Six members of the
Council are appointed by the Prime Minister with the approval of the
Diet, and the Vice-Minister of Transportation is the seventh member,
acting ex officio. In all twenty years of its history, the Minister of
Transportation has never disapproved a recommendation of the
Council; the significance of this fact can only be evaluated in light of
the actual consultation process which normally transpires between the
Bureau Chief and the Council. Staff of the Council assigned to draft
a recommendation consult with the staff of the Bureau Chief who are
assignea to the same case. They exchange drafts and undertake the
negotiations which eventually lead to an agreed recommendation.
Sometimes the Minister of Transportation has indicated a general
policy in advance. But even if he has not, no recommendation of the
Council is ever formally issued until it is known to be agreeable and
acceptable to the Minister.
When the issue is the licensing of a bus line, truck route, air route or
railway, public notice of application for the license is given, and protests
must be filed within two weeks. If there is a protest, a public hearing
must be held; if there is no protest, a public hearing still may be held.
At the hearing, witnesses are heard, and a record is kept. Lawyers do
not usually appear (although they may if they desire), and the
Bureau staff members assigned to the case will be present. After the
hearing, conferences are held by the Council members, Examiners,
Bureau Chief, and staff, and, as noted earlier, the Council's recommendation is finalized when agreement has been reached between the
Council and the Bureau Chief. The Gumma Central Bus K.K.'s objec-
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tion to the fairness of the Council's hearing proceedings cannot be
fully understood without knowledge of this background. On the other
hand, the Tokyo High Court's conclusion that the Council's consultation with the Bureau prior to making its recommendation did not affect
the independence and fairness of the Council's judgment is also understandable in light of this background. Since such consultation in advance is a routine process, neither secret nor peculiar to that particular
case, it did not shock the court.
With the exception of the law governing the Radio Regulatory
Council, Japanese administrative statutes generally do not require
Ministers to base their decisions on findings of fact by administrative
councils. Instead, they usually provide only that Ministers must pay
due respect to council recommendations. Under such statutes, the
courts tend to characterize the councils as "mere advisory organs,"
as distinguished from "participating organs." The conclusion drawn
from this premise is that, inasmuch as Ministers are not bound by
council recommendations or fact-findings, a "mere" procedural defect
(e.g., neglect of fair hearing) in the formation of an advisory opinion
does not alone taint the validity of Ministers' final decisions. This
attitude is reflected in a variety of cases, for example in the fourth
point of the Tokyo High Court's opinion in the Gumma Bus case,
supra.
Judicial references to "mere" advisory organs (which is a form of
popular participation in the decision-making process) and "mere"
neglect of statutory administrative procedures (which provisions could
be the most important safeguard against abuse of executive power)
do not sound strange at all to the ears of Japanese lawyers. The
traditional, and still prevailing, Japanese rationale is that illegal administrative actions are not all void or revocable, but are void only
where the fault involved is clear and grave. Generally speaking, failure
to consult an advisory organ is not considered clear and grave error;
rather such consultation is deemed necessary "merely" to ensure the
deliberateness of administrative actions in an internal, rather than
external, context. 0 Therefore, even when an agency completely ignores
Concerning the traditional, continental theory of administrative actions, see T.
(Japanese administrative law) 252 ff., 287 ff (1936); J.
TANAKA, GY6SE=6 S6RON (Administrative law general theory) 319 ff., 350 ff. (1957).
70.

MINOBE, 1 Niom Gy6SEiH6
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an advisory organ with whom it is legally obliged to consult prior to
making a final decision, the agency's action will not necessarily be void
or revocable, even though it is illegal.71 Although this traditional theory
sheds no light on fair hearing procedures by such administrative councils, it may yet help us to understand the Japanese attitude toward due
process of law in the administrative context.
Unfortunately, after the war the Supreme Court adopted this familiar, continental theory of administrative actions without much reflection. For example, in Nasu v. Yamada (the Land Substitution case) 72
the plaintiff lost a tract of land to the defendant by way of a "Land
7
Substitution Schedule" under the Special City-Planning Law of 1946. 1
The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the schedule was void because the
City of Takamatsu, before making the schedule, had not consulted the
local Land Partitions Adjustment Committee as required by the statute. Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed in both the Takamatsu District
Court, and the Takamatsu High Court, and somehow, neither of the
two lower courts even discussed this particular issue. On appeal, the
71. A good example of this traditional view is found in the decision of the Great
Court of Cassation in Ueda v. Shimoyabara et al (The Farm Rent case), H6ritsu shimbun
(No. 4827) 3 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Dec. 16, 1942), where the plaintiff, a farmland owner,
demanded payment of farm rent in kind at a rate fixed years before. In fact, the rate
was substantially reduced in 1941 by the order of each prefectures Governor pursuant
to the Temporary Farm Land Control Order to implement the National Mobilization
Law of 1938, the underlying policy being to help the exhausted tenants who were the
main source of the Japanese Army. Ueda contended that the Governor's order was void
because he had not consulted the local Agriculture Committee before issuing it, as
provided by the Control Order. The Court held, however, that since the Committee
was merely an advisory organ, the Governor was not bound by its advice in any way,
and his decision to reduce the rate was not void even though he acted illegally in ignoring
the Committee's existence. Another example is the May 17, 1915, Administrative Court's
decision, 26 Gy6roku 529, ruling that a governmental employee who had been hired
without the required recommendation of the Ordinary Governmental Employees Examination Committee was nevertheless entitled to a retirement pension, since his employment had become effective when the hiring decision was made by a particular bureau
chief, the Committee being merely an advisory organ. The results in both of these cases
were probably sound, satisfying justice in the given situations. HRowever, the broad
reasoning used carries the danger of encouraging neglect of procedural law by administrators in general.
The Grand Court of Cassation (Daishin'in), then the highest court of Japan, was
transformed into the Supreme Court (Saik5 Saibansho) in 1947 under the New Constitution. The Administrative Court (Gyasei Saibansho) was the organ which finally
reviewed administrative actions, independently from the judiciary. This extraordinary
court was abolished under the new Constitution Article 76(2): "No extraordinary tribunal shall be established nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final
judicial power."
72. 10 Minshfi 1468 (Sup. Ct., 3rd Petty Bench, Nov. 27, 1956). This is an ordinary
civil case between private parties in which an agency action was challenged collaterally.
73. Tokubetsu toshi keikakuith (Special city planning law) (Law No. 81, 1946).
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disregard of the issue, but the
plaintiff attacked the lower courts'
7
Supreme Court affirmed, saying:

1

It is true that [the City] must hear the opinion of the local Land
Partitions Adjustment Committee to make a land substituting
disposition. (The Special City Planning Law Article 10.) However, it is not necessarily construed that the consultation with the
LPAC is a prerequisite for such disposition. The Rule Implementing SCPL Article 11 provides that where the LPAC refuses to
convene or submit its opinion, the authority can make a decision
without waiting. This article indicates that the Law is intended to
require the consultation as a mere, formal procedure for a land
substitution disposition. We cannot understand the Law as making
the consultation a condition necessary for such disposition. Therefore, although the court below erred in upholding the legality of
the present land substitution disposition without inquiry into
whether [the City] had heard the opinion of the LPAC, this
error does not affect the conclusion reached by the court below.
(Emphasis ours.)
The outcome of this litigation may be sound: perhaps the defendant's interest in the newly-acquired land should not be damaged
on account of the public authority's disregard of statutory procedures
in the land substitution process, of which the defendant had no knowledge and for which he was not to blame. Nevertheless, the reasoning
does not seem very convincing. The above statute states very simply:
"The authority shall decide the matters relating to land substitution
and compensation therefor after hearing the opinion of the Land
Partitions Adjustment Committee." There is ample room in this language for a positive interpretation, that the consultation is a prerequisite to agency action relating to land substitution and compensation. Why was it necessary for the highest court to go out of its way
to encourage neglect of statutory administrative processes, thereby
denying the natural interpretation of the statute? The Court's reference
to the Rule Implementing Article 11 is far from appropriate, because
that article is apparently an exceptional, emergency provision; it seems
more than unusual for the LPAC to "refuse" to respond to a request
for consultation. Moreover, the judiciary can review any implementing
rule made by an administrative agency, if necessary, to see whether it
74.
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is consistent with the statute, or with the Constitution. The traditional
Japanese inclination to make light of administrative "process" is particularly evident in this case, specificially in the often-used phraseology,
"as a mere, formal procedure." In an effort to protect the defendant's
interests in the land, the Court seems to have committed the error of
killing a fly with a spear. The Court could easily have dismissed the
appeal on other grounds. 5 But, two years later, the Supreme Court
again applied this traditional view in Kobari v. Fuksima-Ken
Senkyo Kanri I'inkai (Fukushima Prefecture Election Management
Commission) (the Town-Village Merger case),76 another case where
the same result might have been reached on less devastating grounds.
These opinions of the Supreme Court have clearly discouraged
efforts by lower courts to review administrative action from a due
process of law perspective. Especially conspicuous has been the conservative tendency of High Court judges, reflecting the Supreme
Court's attitude. Undoubtedly it was quite natural that the traditional,
continental theory of administrative actions should persist after the
war, considering that the pre-war scholars, judges and Government
officials remained in their posts after the war. But this survival was
indeed unfortunate when we consider how urgently Japan needed a
radical change in its mode of legal thinking during its period of transition from authoritarian bureaucracy to democratic administration.
75. The Court could have ruled, for instance, that in light of Artide 11 of the Gyusef
jiken sosh6 tokureihg (Administrative litigation special law) (Law 81, 1948), the,
particular agency action could not be revoked, illegal though it was, because revocation
would inevitably cause great public confusion respecting use of the tracts of land involved. The Court might even have suggested, by way of dictum, that the plaintiff could
sue the agency for damages under paragraph (3) of Article 11 and the Kokka baishoh
(State compensation law) (Law No. 125, 1948). The Administrative Litigation Special
Law (Law No. 81, 1948) Article 11 (presently, the Gyosci jiken sosh~ha (Administrative
litigation act) (Law No. 139, 1962) art. 31) provides that the court can dismiss a
complaint where the revocation of an illegal agency action will have a serious adverse
effect on the public welfare (par. 1), provided that the judgment contains a declaration
that the agency action was illegal (par. 2), and that the plaintiff is not precluded thereby
from suing the government for damages (par. 3).
76. 12 Minshii 2097 (Supreme Court, 2d Petty Bench, Sept. 19, 1958). Lower court
decisions reflecting the same attitude are Fujiwara v. Nagasaki-Ken Chiji (Governor of
Nagasaki Prefecture), 5 Gy6sei reishfil 1962 (Nagasaki Dist. Ct., Aug. 6, 1954) (failure
of governor to consult local Fishery Adjustment Committee before deciding between
two competing applications for an ocean fishery license); Ito v. Shimane-Ken Chiji
(Governor of Shimane Perfecture) (the Hot Spring case), 14 Gy6sei reishfi 2242
(Hiroshima High Ct., Dec. 25, 1963), reversing 10 Gy~sd reishfi 2264 (Matsue Dist. Ct.,
Nov. 29, 1959) (failure of governor to consult local Hot Spring Council before granting
permission to one innkeeper to install a motor system which would increase his supply
of hot spring water and decrease the supply of another innkeeper).
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But perhaps we should derive some slight consolation from the fact
that even the traditional theory demands strict observance of procedural safeguards when a person's status and vested rights may be
directly affected by a particular administrative action (as in the cases
of disciplinary proceedings and revocation of licenses).
For example, in Minagawa v. Fukuoka-Ken Keisatsu-Honbuchio
(Fukuoka Police Bureau) (the Police Officer Dismissal case),7" the
plaintiff-policeman had been dismissed by the Police Bureau Chief
upon recommendation by the local Police Disciplinary Committee. The
local Police Rules provided that, where the Chief requests the Committee to conduct a disciplinary hearing, the Committee must send to
the party charged a "Notice of Hearing," accompanied by a copy of
the Chief's "Request for [hearing for the purpose of] Disciplinary
Disposition," which contains the details of the misconduct charged.
The Rules also provided that there must be at least 15 days between
the notice and the hearing date. However, in this case, the Committee
sent the policeman a Notice of Hearing only three days before the
hearing, and did not attach thereto a copy of the Request for Disciplinary Disposition. The Notice of Hearing did contain a column entitled "Reasons for Disciplinary Hearing," but the statement in that
column was very abstract: "The person named failed to observe police
discipline during his suspension from duty." (He had been suspended
from duty for other reasons.) The Request for Disciplinary Disposition submitted by the Bureau Chief to the Committee, on the other
hand, contained a much more concrete statement concerning the alleged
misconduct: "The person named told a newspaperman that he had
been unjustly suspended from duty for no other reason than the chief's
emotional prejudice against him, and that he was then intending to
appeal to the Fukuoka Division of the Ministry of Justice." During
the hearing, the plaintiff objected to the three day notice but, under
the circumstances, felt compelled to respond to the Committee's questions on the merits. He then requested that the Committee receive the
testimony of certain witnesses, which the Committee did, though it
subsequently recommended that the policeman be dismissed.
The plaintiff brought suit seeking (1) a declaration that the initial

77.
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suspension from duty had been null and void, and (2) a revocation
of the subsequent dismissal. The Fukuoka District Court sustained
the complaint on both counts. The law authorized the Police Bureau
Chief to discipline police officers in only three ways: (a) reprimand,
(b) reduction of salary, or (c) dismissal. Therefore, the order to suspend the plaintiff from duty was obviously null and void. Respecting
the later dismissal, the court held that there had been grave procedural
faults in the Committee's hearing inasmuch as the plaintiff had not
been informed of the alleged misconduct with which he was charged,
and, consequently, he had not been able to prepare his defense
properly. Had the procedure been correct, the outcome of the hearing
could have been quite different. Since the plaintiff objected to the
improper procedure at the start of the hearing, the fact that he went
on to contest the allegations made did not cure or waive the illegality
of the Committee's action. Accordingly, the ultimate dismissal based
upon the Committee's recommendation, which was the result of the
gravely illegal hearing, had to be revoked, so that the Committee might
properly conduct another hearing.78
The Fukuoka High Court, however, reversed the District Court's
holding as to the dismissal, and rejected that part of the complaint.
The non-delivery of a copy of the "Request for Disciplinary Disposition" was deemed immaterial, because the statement of the "Reason
for Disciplinary Hearing" contained in the "Notice of Hearing" was
considered to be an adequate, although somewhat abstract, summary
of the Request. In addition, the High Court thought that the plaintiff
should be regarded as having waived or withdrawn his procedural objection when he eventually answered and defended on the merits. Thus,
the High Court concluded that the procedural faults were light, rather
than grave. 9
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court, Justice Kuriyama presiding, set aside the High Court's decision and reinstated the District
Court's judgment in toto. The Court emphasized that the purpose of
the notice procedure is to let the party know the nature of the charges
against him, and to give him a fair opportunity to prepare his defense.

78.
79.

2 Gy6sei reishCi 1098 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., May 18, 1951).
5 Gy6sei reishfi 1518 (Fukuoka High Ct., June 22, 1954).
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Further, the Court very properly observed that it would be too much
to require the charged party to persist in objecting to the entire procedure, when, as a matter of fact, the Committee gave him no choice
but to answer and defend on the merits."0
C. Hearings by Ordinary Administrative Agencies
In cases where the administrative commissions, boards or advisory
councils are not involved, hearings required by statute are administered
by the ordinary administrative agencies-e.g., Ministers, bureau chiefs,
officials, police officers, etc. However, there are very few judicial decisions dealing with such hearing procedures. Fortunately, the Rinji
Gyirsei Chisakai,the Special Commission for Investigating [the Present Condition and Future Reform of] Administration, has provided an
excellent general picture of Japanese administrative hearings in its
careful, nation-wide survey conducted between 1962 and 1964. In our
discussion, we rely heavily upon its 1964 REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE
8
and on its "OPINION ON THE REFORM OF ADMINISTRAPROCEDURE,
8'
in order to bridge the gaps
TIVE PROCEDURE TO ASSURE FAIRNESS,"
cases.
by
relevant
covered
not

80. Another case worth noting is Asakura v. Saitama-Ken Chiji (Governor of Saitama
Prefecture), 5 Gy6sei reishti 917 (Urawa Dist. Ct., April 20, 1954), where the Governor's
order to cancel the designation of a certain physician as a Health Insurance doctor, upon
recommendation of the local Social Insurance and Medical Council (SIMC), was suspended
because of a procedural fault in the SIMC's hearing. The Health Insurance Law provides
that the Governor must consult the SIMC before cancelling such a designation, and that
the party shall be notified of the reasons for the cancellation, as well as the date and
place of the hearing. The petitioner-doctor was charged with claiming excessive treatment expenses and the Governor submitted the case to the SIMC on that particular
ground. However, the SIMC did not examine that specific charge, and somehow found
that be had been a retained doctor of a national sanatorium, but had started the private
practice as a Health Insurance doctor without first obtaining the necessary permission of
the authority. The SIMC advised the Governor to cancel his designation as a Health
Insurance doctor for that particular reason. The Urawa District Court issued an order to
suspend the Governor's decision, on the ground that the SIMC had not made any recommendation on the subject-matter presented to it. The court was probably suggesting that,
since the doctor had not been notified of the reason for the cancellation, he had not been
given a fair opportunity to prepare his defense. See Takagi, Gy5sei slhobunzen no chizmon
in 2 SHTT6KEN SHUIO SORITSU JUGO-SHONEN-KINEN ROMBUN-SHU, supra note 14, at 1112.
81. Gyjsei Tetsuzuki Ni Kansuru H4koku (Report on administrative procedure): A
pamphlet issued and submitted on Feb. 7, 1964, by the Rinji Gy6sei Ch6sakai (the special
commission for investigating administration) Daisan semmonbu-kai (the Third special
division) Daini bunka-kai (the Second section), represented by M. Kan'ichi Kodama and
Prof. Kiminobu Hashimoto. Some call this report simply the "Hashimoto Report." The
following description is primarily based on this Report, at 17-28.
82. GYSSEI No KSas KAKxuH NO TAmss No TETSUZUKI NO KAncAxU Ni KANSuRU
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Chapter II (the Statutory Environment of Administrative Procedure) of the Commission's Report emphasizes the conspicuous lack
of uniformity among statutory provisions for administrative hearings.
Among these, there is extreme confusion, even in terminology. Many
different terms are used for "hearing": some statutes use ch -mon (to
hear and listen) or chk-mon (to hear and inquire); some use benmei
suru kikai (opportunity to explain), shakumei suru kikai (opportunity to clarify), chinjutsu suru kikai (opportunity to make a statement); some others use shinmon (to try and inquire), shinri (to
try and decide), shimpan (to try and judge), krot-shinri (to try
orally and decide); and still others use iken no chinjutsu (statement
of opinion), etc. The Report concludes that there are no distinguishable standards for, or reasons for using, these different words. But this
lack of uniformity in terminology has been very annoying to the
public, and detrimental to efficient administration.
In addition, the methods of legislative provision for hearings are
extremely diverse. 3 Some statutes have comparatively detailed provisions; for example, Article 9 of the Building Standards Law provides
as follows:
Article 9(1) [The agency in charge may order suspension of
construction of a building or removal, remodelling or prohibition
of use thereof in case there is a violation of the Building Standards
Law.]
(2) Where the agency intends to order any of the above
measures, it shall give to the person subject to such order a written
notice of the specific measure to be taken and the reasons therefor.
(3) The above person may request the agency within 3 days
from the receipt of the above notice, to conduct a public hearing.
(4) When requested as above, the agency shall ask the above
person or his counsel to appear before it and shall conduct a
public hearing.
(5) Where a public hearing is to be held as above, the specific
measure to be taken and the date and place of the above hearing
Ix=N (Opinion on the reform of administrative procedure to assure fairness): A pamphlet issued and submitted by the Rinji Gy6sei Ch6sakai represented by Mr. Ki'ichiro
Sato. This opinion also appears in Jiji rsOsEcqsA, Gy6sE N;o XArxAXu, Rniyj GYSs~i
cn6SAEAI IKENSHO (Reform of Administration, the Special Commission's Recommendations) 488-504 (1967).
83. The statutory examples used in this section are found in Rnxji GYOSEi CHBSAKAI,
OPnioN 4-14.
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shall be made known to the above person and be made public at
least two days before the date.
(6) The above person may, at the hearing, produce witnesses
and evidence in his favor.
(7)-(11) [Emergency measures can be taken without giving
a hearing.]
Another good example is Article 7 of the Medical Practitioners Law
which contains the following paragraphs:
Article 7 (1)-(4) [Substantive provisions for cancellation, suspension, re-issuance of license.]
(5) [In the case of cancellation or suspension of license], an
advance notice shall be sent to the licensee subject to such disposition, stating therein the date and place of hearing and the
grounds constituting the charges against him.
(6) The licensee shall be heard in his defense either in person
or by counsel, and may produce witnesses and other evidence
in his favor.
(7) The person conducting the hearing shall take and preserve
a record of hearing, and shall prepare a written report of his
finding and state his opinion to Minister of Health and Welfare
for decision.
However, such detail is exceptional. Most statutes simply provide that
there shall be a hearing, and that the date and place of the hearing
shall be announced. For example, Article 43-15 of the Health Insurance Law provides as follows:
Article 43-15. The prefectural governor shall, in a case where
he intends to refuse the designation of an insurance medical care
organ or insurance dispensary, or to cancel its designation or to
cancel the registration for an insurance doctor or insurance
pharmacist, give the establisher of said medical care organ, dispensary, or said insurance doctor or insurance pharmacist an
opportunity to explain. In this case, the date and the time, place
and matter to be explained shall be made known in writing beforehand.
In addition, there are some statutes whose provisions state only that
there shall be a hearing; for example, the Road Law, Article 71:
Article 71 (1)-(2) [The agency in charge may cancel the permission for road construction formerly granted or may order
suspension of construction, removal or remodelling of a structure,
etc.]
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(3) Where the agency intends [to take an action under the
preceding paragraphs], the person subject to such action shall
be given a hearing.
The Commission's Report concludes that this lack of legislative
uniformity is generally neither related to, nor the result of, diversity in
the nature and content of respective administrative activities, but
instead is a by-product of hasty legislative creation of such provisions
after the war, without sufficient study or reference to established
principles, thus leaving matters largely to executive discretion. The
Report also discloses many other deficiencies in most of the statutes.
They usually fail to state whether the party can be represented by an
attorney, how many days must intervene between the notice and the
hearing, whether the hearing shall be conducted by the official in
charge or by an independent examiner, whether the hearing shall be
an open or closed one, and so on. Consequently, practice differs widely
among the agencies.
The Commission's Opinion on Reform provides several examples:
The Road Law merely provides that the agency in charge (in most
cases, the Governor of each prefecture) shall hold a hearing prior to
taking certain actions (like suspension of road construction, and
evacuation of structures), and thus the administrative practice respecting the permissibility of representation by counsel differs from prefecture to prefecture. The same is true under the Land Partitions Adjustment Law. The Beauty Shop Law is silent concerning the period of
time between notice and hearing in a case of cancellation of a business
license, and the administrative practice consequently varies among the
authorities; some of them allow only three days. Some prefectures
conduct an open hearing to cancel or suspend an architect's license,
and some conduct a closed hearing, because the Architects Law is
silent on the point. The Opinion observes that the lack of detailed
provisions respecting the manner of conducting hearings has turned
the hearing system into a mere formality.
There are some statutes which completely omit mention of hearings,
thus making possible unreasonable disparities among similar administrative actions. For example, Article 2-13 of the Airplane Manufacturing Law, Article 37-3 of the Harbor and Bay Law, and Article 50 of
the Employment Stability Law all fail to require a hearing before
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cancellation of a business license, in stark contrast to other similar
cases involving a cancellation of a business license. Moreover, disparities exist even under the same statute, and within the same article.84
According to the Report, the above-described various defects in the
existing statutory provisions may have three detrimental effects: Since
administration of the hearing provisions of these statutes is left entirely to the discretion of the respective agencies, a merely formal
hearing may be regarded as meeting the statutory requirements, regardless of whether the people involved are given a real opportunity
to be heard. This is especially true in Japan, where there is a conspicuous absence of judicial decisions indicating the exact ingredients
of a fair hearing. Agencies which are anxious to abide by the spirit of
a statute may not be able to act promptly and efficiently, due to the
absence of specific directions therein. When the contents of statutory
procedural guaranties are so vague and uncertain, citizens are not
likely to be very enthusiastic about their right to a fair hearing.
The Special Commission's survey strongly supports its prediction
of these three ill effects. Chapter III of the Report (Actual Administration of Statutes) begins with this remark relating to mandatory
hearings: "In the first place, it must be pointed out that with few
exceptions, very few hearings have been held." Furthermore, as the
Minister of Postal Services quite unabashedly confirmed in the Twelfth
TV Channel case, it is almost certain that there will be no hearing,
even when the party requests one, where a statute provides for hearing
as a "may" rather than a "must." This conclusion is supported by the
Special Commission's 1963 Interim Report, which contains statistics
showing the infrequency of administrative hearings.sa
The Special Commission enumerates the following reasons for the
scarcity of administrative hearings:

84. An example is the Ddro k~tsfh5 (Road traffic law) art. 104 (Law No. 105,
1960), which requires a hearing before suspending a driver's license for 90 days or more,
but not for less than 90 days. See Shimazu v. Yamagata-Ken K6an I'inkai (Yamagata
Prefecture Public Safety Commission), 11 Gyasei reishi 455, 462 (Sendai High Ct., Feb.
26, 1960), upholding 70 day suspension without hearing since there was no statutory
requirement applicable. See also note 29, supra.
Of course, a case can be made for the reasonableness of distinguishing between a 70
day suspension and a longer suspension for hearing purposes, if the shorter period were
used as a means of providing a temporary suspension pending hearing. Conmpare cases
collected in L. JAFFEE & N. NATnANSON, AD."'isTRATivE LAW 823-27 (3rd ed. 1968).
85. These statistics, for the years 1957 through 1961 are as follows:
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(a) There are many instances in which an administrative agency
avoids a formal administrative action for which a hearing is required
by statute, but instead achieves the same goals by what is generally
called "administrative guidance," i.e., informal but strong suggestion,
advising the applicant in an informal meeting to withdraw his license
application, or suggesting that an entertainment business operator
voluntarily close down his night club for a violation of regulations, and
the like. Annually, there are about 60 cases in which the agency informally instructs a manufacturer voluntarily to correct his weights
and measures, without holding the hearing required by the Industrial
Measures Standardization Law. The Report warns that such administrative guidance may turn many statutory provisions for fair administrative procedure into dead letters.
(b) A portion of the cases where a hearing is avoided are those in
which an agency warns a party to desist from future violations, by
way of administrative suggestion rather than by immediately taking
formal action against him. The Report approves this kind of administrative guidance.
(c) "Next, it must be mentioned here," the Reporter says, "that, as
a matter of the public mentality, people fear that some disadvantage
might be imposed on them tomorrow because they fight with the government officials today." Especially in fields where administrative
control is pervasive, there is a conspicuous tendency for citizens to
avoid open disputes with officials, because they are mindful of the old
(Footnote 85 Continued)
Statistics for later years may of course, show substantial increases, as has already been
indicated with respect to the Central Labor Relations Board. See note 57, supra.
Statistics supplied by the Fair Trade Commission, on the other hand, show no significant
increase in the number of formal complaints and hearings:
Nrutm

FAIR TRADE COMMISSION
or REConErmATIONS AND DEcIsIoNs
Number of Decisions
Number of

Due to

Decisions

Fiscal

Number of

Complaints

Acceptance of

After Formal

Year

Recommendations

Issued

Recommendations

Hearing

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

32
31
18
16
34

2
4
3
4
1

30
26
17
11
28

1
1
3
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sayings, "Revenge may be taken in Nagasaki for an insult in Edo,"
and "The King has long arms." Thus, they commonly accept administrative guidance and waive the right to a hearing. They also avoid
taking advantage of hearing procedures, even when formal action is
taken against them and the statute requires a hearing by use of the
word "must."8 It seems readily apparent that this mentality of the
people largely accounts for the fact that they rarely file administrative
objections with a superior agency, or institute litigation in court, when
a particular agency in charge fails to give them a hearing or conducts
an unfair hearing. The appeals in the Taxi-Cab case and the Gumma
Bus case are important exceptions to this trend. This numerical scarcity of administrative objections and suits for judicial review has
already been reported in Professor Gellhorn's interesting article, Settl87
ing Disagreementswith Officials in Japan.
(d) Finally, the Report states that the vagueness and uncertainty
of statutory provisions for administrative hearings are largely responsible for the infrequency of such hearings.
Furthermore, the Report directs attention to the fact that, in many
instances, completely perfunctory hearing procedures are conducted
merely to satisfy the applicable statutory requirements. Of course,
officials dare not openly violate the law, so they hold hearings reluctantly; but in fact they decide controversies beforehand, and the
results of the hearings are not seriously taken into consideration. Thus,
many hearings end in a few minutes, because parties seldom contest
the charges against them or present evidence in their own favor."8
The Report also specifically mentions the common misinterpretation
of the purpose of hearing procedures; Japanese agencies are apt to
utilize the hearing system as a forum for warning, instructing, guiding,
interrogating and other steps in administrative investigation. This is
especially true in cases involving license revocation or suspension for
86. The statutes sometimes provide that, where the party charged does not appear, the
agency may take action without holding a hearing. E.g., DOro k6tsi~h5 (Road traffic law),
art. 104(5) (Law No. 105, 1960); Jfih5 tikenrui shoji t0 torishimarih5 (Guns and
swords law), art. 12(3) (Law No. 6, 1958). Even without such express provisions, the
same conclusion can be reached on a theory of waiver of hearing.
87. Gellhorn, Settling Disagreements with Officials in Japan, 79 HhAv. L. Rav. 685
(1966).
88. Kaneko, Gytseijiken-sosh6-tokureih6 no jittai (Present condition of the administrative litigation special law) in Ukai (ed.), Gv6sEi TETSUZUKI NO iCENXKf (Study of
administrative procedure) 267, 279, 283 n.20 (1961).
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violation of police regulations such as the Entertainment Business Law,
the Public Bath Law, the Used Goods Stores Law, the Guns and
Swords Law, the Road Traffic Law, etc. These regulations often
employ very misleading phraseology: "[In such and such cases], the
Public Safety Commission shall demand the presence of the party,
and conduct an open hearing." Hence, police officers acting in the name
of the Public Safety Commission 9 tend to think they are ordering the
party to appear before them. Thus, the hearing is not considered
primarily a procedure to enable the party to produce evidence advantageous to him, but rather an opportunity to interrogate him, confirm his repentence, and determine what type of sanction should be
imposed on him-i.e., revocation or suspension, and suspension for
how long. And, conversely, the people charged with violation of these
police regulations tend to think of a notice of hearing as a kind of
subpoena or summons ordering them to appear in the police building.
They are usually not represented by lawyers and they are afraid
of the officials. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that
most people are not enthusiastic about administrative hearings at
all. In summary, the idea that agency hearings are intended to benefit
the people rather than the agencies is still far from prevalent in Japan.
The idea that the purpose of a hearing is to afford the party an
opportunity to present favorable evidence, rather than an opportunity
for the authority to interrogate the party charged, has not thoroughly
penetrated the Japanese courts either. For example, in Nakamoto v.
Tochigi-Ken Chiji (Governor of Tochigi Perfecture),90 a social insurance doctor had been reprimanded by the Governor for alleged overcharges. He challenged the Governor's action on the ground that it
lacked any factual basis, and had been taken without giving the doctor
an opportunity to be heard pursuant to the Code of the Social Insurance Medical Services Auditing. The District Court found that the
89. Although the hearings in police-regulation violation cases are conducted in the
name of a prefectural public safety commission, such daily duties are carried out by
the police bureau, while the commission concentrates primarily on making fundamental
policies and controlling the police bureau generally, Keisatsuhd (Police law), arts. 38(3),
44 (Law No. 162, 1954).
Even in hearings before the Tokyo Public Safety Commission, consisting of the
civilian members, the charged party does not have an opportunity to cross-examine the
police officer who is responsible for the adverse report. Interview with Professor Nobushige
Ukai, Member of Tokyo Public Safety Commission, April 11, 1969.
90. 9 Gy6sei reishii 901 (Utsunomiya Dist. Ct., May 28, 1957).
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plaintiff-doctor had been given notice and ample opportunity to be
heard, because the auditing officers had given him prior notification of
the auditing, had inspected his medical services record on the fixed
auditing date, had prepared their auditing report in his office after
questioning him and considering his explanations, and had then and
there asked him to sign the auditing report, perhaps as a witness to the
inspection procedures. Similarly in the Driver's License Suspension
case," the Sendai High Court rejected plaintiff's demand for a fair
hearing because the law did not require a hearing for a suspension of a
driver's license for less than 90 days; the court added:9"
Moreover, he was interrogated by the police regarding the traffic
accident, and witnessed the accident-inspection [i.e., signed the
inspection paper as a witness]. Thus, he was given an opportunity
to be heard. Therefore, we do not think he should have been given
another day to be heard prior to the present disposition [i.e. suspension of driver's license for 70 days]. (Emphasis ours.)
Finally in the Exam-Cheating case, 3 the Osaka High Court and the
Supreme Court agreed that the student had been given an ample opportunity to be heard because he was called before the students' advisor
and counsellors, was asked some questions by them about the cheating,
and signed, upon request, the student-inquiry paper recording the
questions and answers.
The danger in all three of these cases is that the courts seem to
attach too much importance to a party's signature on an inspectionpaper or inquiry-record prepared by the authority. Realistically speaking, it would be extremely difficult under such circumstances for a
party to refuse the authority's request for his signature on such a
paper. Consequently, it seems unreasonable to say that answering an
officer's interrogatories and signing an inquiry-paper are equivalent
to an opportunity to be heard. The courts should at least recognize, by
analogy to criminal procedure, that the former are a prosecutor's means
of gathering his evidence, and that the latter is the defendant's opportunity to present his evidence. Such judicial recognition would help to
effectuate the ideal expressed in the Special Commission's Report that
91.
92.
93.
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11 Gy6sei reishii 455 (Sendal High Ct., Feb. 26, 1960), notes 29, 84 supra.
11 Gy6sei reishOi at 462.
6 Sh~mu gepp5 1535 (Sup. Ct., 3rd Petty Bench, June 28, 1960), note 28 supra.
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administrative hearings are primarily intended for the protection of
the people, and not for the convenience of the agencies.
The Report also suggests that, in license application cases, the hearing system is defective in its uncertainty as to the time period in which
a licensing agency must decide whether to grant or refuse a license
application, and that administration in this field is further plagued by
public ignorance as to the standards by which applications are decided.
The Report specifically refers to the Taxi-Cab case (Tokyo District
Court's opinion), and stresses the need for prior publication of licensing standards. 4
The Report concludes Chapter III by noting that, despite the unsatisfactory state of the present administrative hearing system, it should
not be regarded as totally deficient. The very fact that agencies usually
do not take immediate, formal, adverse action (because that would
require a hearing), but instead prefer informal administrative guidance, demonstrates that the hearing system is working as a check and
restraint on arbitrary and hasty use of power. Besides this, there are
many examples of successful hearings, and it naturally takes some time
before a new legal system begins to operate successfully and at its full
potential. Consequently, the Commission suggests reform, rather
than abolition, of the present hearing system. To achieve such reform,
the Commission in 1964 recommended to the Cabinet the enactment
of a General Administrative Procedure Law, to cure the above-described deficiencies, and to bring about uniformity of practice among
diverse agencies. It prepared a Draft Law which contains, inter alia,
provisions for the following:9"
(a) a fixed period of time (generally 3 months) in which to dispose
of application cases;
(b) publication of detailed licensing standards;
(c) a warning period: opportunity for the people to cure voluntarily their violation of regulations before imposing final, adverse disposition;
(d) at least 10 days between notice and hearing date;
94. The Tokyo High Court's opinion in the Taxi-Cab case, which denied the necessity
of publicizing the licensing standards before decision, was delivered in 1966, two years
after the Commission's Report.
95. RiNji GY6SI CH6SAxAI REPORT 87-149, supra note 3.
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(e) segregation of examiners and decision-makers;
(f) a right to employ attorneys;
(g) a right to inspect records of hearings, and to take exceptions;
(h) a right to explain and defend, with favorable witnesses and
other helpful evidence;
(i) the principle of open hearings;
(j) a right to intervene;
(k) that tentative decisions by examiners, and final decision based
thereon, must contain findings of fact and reasons for decision;
(1) disclosure of the tentative decision to the party, and a right to
file an objection with the decision-maker before the final decision is
made;
(m) allowance of summary procedures for simple cases.
This Draft Law was prepared under the leadership of Professor
Hashimoto, after study of the United States Administrative Procedure
Act, as well as the corresponding statutes of Austria, England, Italy,
Poland, Spain and other countries. The Draft was submitted to the
principal administrative agencies as well. We were told by staff members of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau that Professor Hashimoto's
Report and Proposal (i.e., the 1964 Special Commission's Report and
Opinion) were quite a "shock" to many government officials, because
they are generally neither interested in, nor familiar with, the problems
of administrative procedure. Because the proposed act contemplates
drastic changes in the present system of administrative hearings, government officials are generally unfriendly toward it, and are particularly opposed to (1) a fixed period of time (3 months unless otherwise specified) in which to decide application cases; (2) an inflexible
requirement that all dispositions be made in writing unless expressly
excused; (3) publication of detailed licensing standards, which would
be like "disclosure of their strategy to the enemy side"; and (4)
disclosure of tentative decisions, which would be a breach of the confidential relationship between arms of the agency. We were also told
that, while there has yet been no official response to the Hashimoto
Draft, the proposed act is regarded as the most important issue before
the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, which gives legal advice to the government on legislation and the drafting of statutes. Finally, we were
assured that a number of government officials are genuinely concerned
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about procedural protection of human rights, and rationalization of
Japanese administrative procedures. 8
IV. IN CONCLUSION: THE TAXI-CAB AND GUMMA BUS
CASES IN COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE
As the Report on Administrative Procedure frequently emphasizes,
the existing unsatisfactory condition of the administrative hearing
system in Japan cannot be fully understood wholly apart from the
social and political attitudes of the Japanese people. Despite the lofty
language of the Preamble to the Japanese Constitution, proclaiming

that
Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for
which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of
which are enjoyed by the people
still, in the minds of many of the people (especially the older and the
less-educated), government officials remain "okam?"-lord, ruler, or
97
superior-rather than "k boku"-public servants of the people.
This attitude is probably shared to a considerable extent by the public
officials themselves, since they are recruited from -the best students
of leading universities and are quite conscious of their elite status."
Moreover, the rapid recovery of the Japanese post-war economy,
accompanied by the increasingly specialized and complicated administration of a "welfare state" and a partially-planned economy, has

96. These statements about the governmental response to the Commission's recommendation are based upon a meeting on May 26, 1969, between Professor Nathanson
and Mr. Yasuro Kikui, Councillor of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau. Others present
were Professor Ogawa of Tokyo University, Professor Hokama of Chuo University, Mr.
Yokota as interpreter, of International Christian University and other members of the
Cabinet Legislative Bureau.
97. Except for some local farmers' riots and merchants' self-governments during and
before the Tokugawa Era (ending in 1868), Japan has had no revolution from the
bottom-up. Both the Meiji Restoration and the post-war democratization were the
results of top-down political reforms. See generally, E. REISHAUER, JAPAN: PAST AND
PRESENT, (rev. ed. 1953); J. FAIBANx, E. RmsHAuan & A. CRAIG, EAST ASIA: THE
MODERN TRANSFORmATION (1965); K. NAxIrmURA, THnE FORMATIn orF MODERN JAPAN
AS VIEWED FROm LEGAL HISTORY (1962).
98. See S. Tsuji, NmoN KANRavsEr No K. ryf (Study on Japanese Bureaucracy)
(1952); KUBOTA, HIGHER CIrI SERVANTS IN POSTWAR JaAN (1969).
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tended to reinforce the inherent strength of the Japanese bureaucracy.
Some even speak of the birth of a new bureaucracy, especially in the
fields of economic and industrial regulation dominated by the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (well known to foreign business
as MITI). Lawyers dealing with that agency are thoroughly familiar
with its velvet-glove approach, through which "administrative guidance" (gy-sei-shid-) and "administration by circulars" (tsfitasu ni
yoru gyisei) " have substantially supplanted "administration by law"
(hiritsu ni yjru gysei). Moreover, it is likely that the common people
of Japan are well-inured to a substantially similar, though perhaps
less polite and sophisticated, system of public administration. In short,
the basic characteristics of Japanese government-especially its perpetuation of the so-called "Bureaucrat's Government" of pre-war
Japan-remind us of a favorite saying of Japanese scholars, attributed
to Otto Mayer, the father of German administrative law: "Constitutions change, administrative law remains the same."' 0 0
This peculiar background of Japanese administrative law may help
us to understand why Judge Shiraishi, the presiding judge of the
Tokyo District Court, was so anxious to find a firm constitutional
basis (as well as statutory grounds) for his decisions in the Taxi-Cab
and Gumma Bus cases. Nevertheless, the obvious appeal and significance of his approach should not blind us to the very real difficulties
involved in applying the due process theory to both of these cases.
Application of Article 31 to the facts of these cases requires not only
the substitution of "fundamentally fair procedures" for "procedures
established by law," but also necessitates characterization of a license
denial as an "other criminal penalty." Even in the United States,
where we do not have to struggle with any such limiting language, it
has taken us a long time to make due process requirements generally
applicable to license application proceedings.' 0 '

99. As to "administrative guidance," see articles cited in note 50. As to "administration
by circulars," see generally, TANAxA, H~itsu ni yoru gydsei to tsftatsu ni yoru gytsei
(Administration by law and administration by circulars), 32 JicHi KENKYU 7 (1956);
Arai, Tsfitatsu gycsei no konnichi-teki shikaku (Present phase of administration by
NO HIROBA 30 (No. 10, 1964).
circulars), 17 HIsU
100. "Verfassungsrecht vergeht, Verwaltungsrecht besteht." Otto Mayer, Deutsches
Verwaltungsrecht, 3 AurL. BD. I, VORWORT (1924).
101. The United States Supreme Court has not elaborated any general principle of
due process applicable to all types of licensing applications, although it has stated
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Furthermore, the exact issues involved in the both the Taxi-Cab and
Gumina Bus cases are fairly debatable, even if a statutory or constitutional requirement of fair hearing is assumed. For example, there is
a certain practical common-sense appeal to the government's view
that, in a case like Kawakami's, the ultimate standards of decision
should not be disclosed to the applicants until after the decision is
made; otherwise, applicants might be tempted to make their qualifications conform to the standards, even at the expense of truth. Veracity
would then be the major issue, and, when the number of applicants is
so large, the probability of abstract fairness in determining that issue
might be significantly impaired. 0 2 But, of course, if the standards are
not disclosed, it is essential that the hearing examination bring out all
that a certified public accountant may not be denied the opportunity to practice before
the Board of Tax Appeals, upon character grounds, without opportunity for notice and
hearing (Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926));
and that an applicant who has passed the bar examination may not be denied admission to
the bar on character grounds without notice and hearing, including confrontation and
cross-examination of those whose word might deprive him of his livelihood. Willner v.
Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-106 (1963). It has also been
held by lower federal courts that a bondsman may not be denied renewal of his license
on character grounds without such "hearing and opportunity to answer . . . as would
constitute due process" (In re Carter, 192 F.2d 15, 17 (DC. Cir. 1951)), and that an applicant cannot be denied a liquor store license without procedural due process. Hornsby
v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1964). Recently the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
has recognized a due process right to a fair hearing in connection with the denial of a
permit to conduct a retail drug store. Milligan v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348
Mass. 491, 204 N.E.2d 504 (1965). In the past many state courts have taken the position
that certain types of licenses (especially liquor licenses) are "privileges" rather than
"rights," and may be denied or revoked in summary proceedings, but such decisions are
now less common. See 1 K. DAvis, AnsrmnsmzArT
TpEATiSE (§§ 7, 19 (1958)), Id. at
182-85 (Supp. 1965); Byse, Opportunity to be Heard in License Issuance, 101 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 57 (1952).
102. This is apparently the consideration which the staff members of the Cabinet
Legislative Bureau had in mind when they said that publication of the standards would
be like disclosing strategy to the enemy. Of course, there are always such arguments
of administrative convenience to justify a denial of fair hearing. This type of argument
was especially common in the controversy over the fairness of loyalty and security hearings in the United States. Disclosure of the government's confidential informants would
supposedly gravely interfere with the investigative efficiency of the FBI. See, e.g., Bailey
v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court,
341 U.S. 918 (1951). Gradually the American courts have grown less tolerant of this
justification. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Garrott v. United States,
340 F.2d 615 (Ct. Cl. 1965). Especially relevant to the particular problem in the TaxiCab case, i.e., disclosure of standards, is the holding in Hornsby v. Allen 326 F.2d 605,
612 (5th Cir. 1964), where the court said:
If it develops that no ascertainable standards have been established by the Board
of Aldermen by which an applicant can intelligently seek to qualify for a license,
then the court must enjoin the denial of licensing under the prevailing system and
until a legal standard is established and procedural due process provided in the liquor
licensing field.
326 F.2d at 612.
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the relevant facts, as was not done in the Taxi-Cab case. This was the
basis of the High Court's decision in that case, and it is difficult to
see how the Supreme Court can avoid affirming, at least on that
ground. 3 For the purposes of that particular case, and even for
longer range purposes, it does not appear to be crucial whether the
theoretical basis for decision is a constitutional theory of due process
derived from Article 31 and other articles, or simply a principle of
statutory interpretation. The statute in the Taxi-Cab case provided for
hearings and presumably the legislature intended them to be fair.'
There is ample precedent in Anglo-American law for the proposition
that, even in the absence of a statutory hearing provision, the requirement of fair hearing may be implied if the nature of the administrative
function to be performed makes it appropriate. 10 If the Supreme Court
of Japan were to adopt this general principle of statutory interpretation, buttressed by the general spirit of constitutional protection of
individual rights, it might well be just as effective as a more elaborate
and specific, but also more questionable, constitutional approach to the
problem.'
The particular issues of fairness involved in the Gumma Bus case
are more difficult than those of the Taxi-Cab case. Failure to disclose,
103. In view of the extremely narrow ground of the High Court's decision, the
government's decision to appeal, and thus risk affirmance by the Supreme Court on the
broader grounds adopted by the District Court, is rather surprising. Extended conversations with the government attorneys involved did not provide any satisfactory
explanation of this strategy.
104. In this connection it may be of some interest to note again the exact provisions
of the statute; see note 31, supra.
Since the Bureau noticed the application for hearing without awaiting the request of
interested parties, the applicable provision is presumably Article 122-2(1). Conceivably,
such a hearing might be regarded as a step in the investigation for the convenience of
the administrator, rather than for the benefit of the parties, as explained in the text.
Perhaps this is the fundamental position of the government, which helps explain its
decision to appeal.
105. Some support for this might even be found in the English use of the principle
of "natural justice" to imply a right of hearing where the statute is not explicit. See e.g.,
Nathanson, The Right to Fair Hearing in Indian, English and American Administrative
Law, 1 JoUR. INDIAN L. INST. 493 (1959); DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REmVIw OF ADMIxnSTRATivE ACTION 135-230 (1968). Compare ART. 10., UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, U.N.G.A. (1948) in M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS 96 (1962);
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDO S, Art. 6. See
also Newman, Natural Justice, Due Process and the New International Convenants on
Human Rights: Prospectus, PUBLIC LAW, 274, 293-313 (1967).
106. This would be somewhat similar to what the United States Supreme Court has
done in disposing of difficult cases like Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), on
grounds of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional grounds, while suggesting
grave constitutional doubts.
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in advance of the hearing, the exact standards for decision and the
specific issues which will be deemed relevant, may have been of little
significance, because such factors were well-known to all the parties
concerned from their general experience with the subject matter. Presumably they were comparable to the issues involved in an ICC
common-carrier certification case, including the adequacy of existing
service, the extent to which the proposed service would be an improvement, the competitive effects upon existing services, and the like.
American law does not require the ICC to spell out such factors at the
beginning of each hearing, even though specific findings must be made
with respect to each of them. Ordinarily, however, ICC procedure does
include an initial or recommended decision, which serves to crystallize
issues and provides a basis for exceptions which may be argued before
the final deciding authority (although, in initial licensing cases, even
this may be dispensed with under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in exceptional circumstances10 7). More shocking to American ears is the Japanese practice, approved by the High Court's
opinion in the Gumma Bus case, whereby the Advisory Council consuits with the Bureau of the Ministry and withholds its recommendations until agreement is reached on disposition of the case. The
problems involved here are essentially similar to those involved in
our Morgan cases,10 8 and in the English Arlidge case. 10 9 The Japanese
practice is not quite identical to an ex parte discussion between the
prosecuting and deciding branches of the government, since neither
107. 5 U.S.C. § 557 (1967). In comparing the Taxi-Cab and Gumma Bus cases it
might also be suggested that they might be distinguished from each other for hearing
purposes on the basis of the nature of the factual issues involved. In the Taxi-Cab case,
the facts in dispute concerned the personal qualifications of the particular applicant;
these would doubtedless be .considered by Professor Davis as "adjudicatory facts,"
peculiarly appropriate for determination in a trial-type hearing. See 1 Davis, ADmnmTrATrvE LAw TREAT sE § 7.02 (1958). In Gumma Bus, on the other hand, the factual
issues involved the compaxative merits of the proposed and existing services and the
general competitive situation pertaining to those services; these might arguably be
regarded as either "adjudicatory" or "legislative" facts, appropriate either for trial-type
or legislative-type hearings. The mere fact that they are generally determined in trialtype hearings in the American practice is hardly conclusive. Compare for example, First
National Bank of Smithfield, North Carolina v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965),
holding that a hearing was not required before a determination by the Comptroller of the
Currency permitting the establishment of a branch of a National Bank in a community
already served by another National Bank. Professor Davis agrees that a trial-type hearing
should not be required in such a situation, although he argues that an informal hearing
should be held. See 1 DAvis ADm=sTRATvE LAW TREATISE § 4.04, 82-83 (Supp. 1965).
108. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); 304 U.S. 1 (1938)-.
109. Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] A.C. 120.
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the Bureau nor the Council functions as a prosecutor. But their
ex parte consultation does, nonetheless, deprive the applicant of an
opportunity to hear and counter what might well be the most damaging
arguments against his position, just as, in the Morgan cases, the
Bureau of Animal Industry's ex parte presentation to the Secretary of
Agriculture concerning the reasonableness of the rates in issue was
deemed to deprive the interested parties of an opportunity for fair
hearing. But, here again, as in the Taxi-Cab case, it is not essential
for the Supreme Court to expound a constitutional theory of due
process in order to find the hearing unfair. The statute itself requires
a hearing, and it would require no excessive stretching of the language
to hold this means a full and fair hearing, in the same way that Chief
Justice Hughes interpreted the statutory requirement of a "full hearing" in the second Morgan case.' It is true that Chief Justice Hughes
analogized the Bureau of Animal Industry to a prosecutor in that case,
since its position at the hearing had been primarily adverse to that of
the private parties concerned."' However, that analogy was rather
overdrawn and certainly not the strongest point in the Chief Justice's
opinion. A closer analogy might be drawn between the position of the
Advisory Council and the hearing examiner in the American cases,
or the inspector (hearing officer) in the English cases. It is now
standard procedure in both American and English practice to disclose
the hearing officer's report in advance of the final decision, in order
to give private parties an opportunity to challenge his findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and adverse recommendations."12 In the Japanese
setting, it would seem reasonable to require that, if the Bureau in
charge intends to recommend to the Minister a disposition which is
adverse to the interests of any private parties, that recommendation
should be disclosed to the private parties in time for them to counter
the force of the arguments or findings relied upon by the Bureau. This
could be done either at the hearing before the Advisory Council, or in
110. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. at 19.

111. Id. at 20.
112. In the United States, this is now generally required by the Administrative Procedure Act, as well as by the principles announced in the Morgan cases. Supra note 97.
It has also been generally achieved in Great Britain as a result of the Report of the
Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (1957), popularly known as the
Franks Report, even though it is not required by statute. See H. WADE, TowARDs AD3MNISThATRAE JUSTiCE 70-72
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subsequent written submissions to the Minister, or both. Indeed, it
would seem more consonant with the general statutory scheme of
hearings before the Advisory Council to require that the position of
the Bureau be made known at that hearing, so that it might be countered by the interested parties, and then fully considered by the
Advisory Council, before the Council makes its recommendation to
the Minister. If such a procedure were insisted upon, the hearing
before the Council would be restored to its proper role, and the
recommendations of the Council would clearly be entitled to the respect which the statutes originally intended for them.
In a general sense, we might draw an analogy between the present
state of Japanese administrative law and the state of American administrative law in the 1930's, during which our Supreme Court decided the Morgan cases. The American people were just then becoming
conscious of the importance of administrative fact-finding, and were
disturbed by the great variety of administrative procedures. Congress,
too, was beginning to take part in the fray, by suggesting various
methods of rationalizing administrative procedures along more judicial
lines. After extensive investigations, there finally emerged the Report
of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in
1941, and the adoption of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
in 1946.113 It would be exciting indeed if the Supreme Court of Japan
were to seize the opportunity now presented by the Taxi-Cab and
Gumma Bus cases, to dramatize the problems of the administrative
hearing system and to point out the general road to their solution, as
did Chief Justice Hughes' opinions in the Morgan cases. This might
also prompt more serious consideration in the Cabinet Legislative
Bureau, and eventually in the Diet, of the Hashimoto Draft proposals
for legislative reform of the administrative process. Naturally we do
not suggest that Japanese administrative reform should be patterned
exactly after the American way of doing things. Experience amply
demonstrates that the importer of foreign legal wares must have a
keen eye for the needs, tastes, and peculiarities of his local market.
Besides, the American emphasis upon the trial-type hearing is cer113. For a brief history of the developments leading to the adoption of the APA, see
Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 IfLixos L. Ra'.
368-371 (1946).
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tainly not entirely above criticism, and in recent years has been subjected to considerable reevaluation and some reform." 4 Nor would we
overlook the obvious fact that the American administrative process,
like the Japanese, must rely on informal methods to dispose of the
overwhelming bulk of its business." 5 But we do think it is not too
much to hope that the Japanese, by realistically reappraising both the
virtues and vices of their present hearing system, may point the way
towards an administrative process, designed to serve efficiently the
needs of a welfare and regulatory state, while yet adequately protecting
the rights, interests and dignity of the individual.
114. A famous and devastating example of such clriticism, aimed especially at the
independent regulatory agencies, is James M. Landis' Report on the Regulatory Agencies
to the President-Elect (Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Seas., Comm.
Print, 1960). A more recent example is the Report of the American Bar Association
Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission (1969). Indications of the need
for particular reforms may also be found in the various reports of the Administrative
Conference of the United States. See Selected Reprints of the Administrative Conference
of the United States, Sen. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., Ist Seas. (1963).
115. See P. WoLL, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW: THE INFORMAL PROCESS (1963).
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